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A wireless network can be exploited in many ways. One way is through intentionally 
corrupting the Frame Check Sequence (FCS) field by using a different Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC) polynomial in order to create a side channel. Malicious nodes exploit the 
fact that normal unsuspecting nodes will immediately drop erroneous frames. A metric 
called the Hamming Distance (HD) was proposed for detection which distinguishes 
legitimate from illegitimate errors. The idea is to apply this HD measure to compare CRC 
values that are generated by different CRC polynomials. The hypothesis is that the 
average HD between two CRC values generated by two different CRC polynomial would 
be significantly far apart than those that are generated by the same CRC polynomial. The 
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Chapter 1  
 
1    Introduction 
 
While wireless solutions allow for maximum portability and communication, it also 
presents many security risks that are aimed at exploiting this medium. The risk becomes 
more imperative when it relates to the mobile communication amongst the soldiers of 
Canadian Armed Forces. When the information relayed amongst soldiers could be 
classified or life critical, any exploitation is not acceptable. Knowing the types of 
exploitation is important when tasked in trying to secure communication channels 
between soldiers. One possible form of exploitation is done through manipulating the 
error detecting mechanism put in place to guard against the unreliable nature of wireless 
communication. Errors in the transmission of frames can occur from signal fading, 
collisions and shadowing effects which can be attributed to many factors such as terrain, 
distance of nodes and interference. To mitigate these unreliability issues, a Frame Check 
Sequence (FCS) field is added to the end of the frame which stores a Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC) value calculated based on the contents of the frame. This value is calculated 
using a predetermined CRC polynomial before it is sent and checked at the receiver for 
consistency. An attack that may exploit this is to intentionally corrupt the FCS by means 
of choosing a different CRC polynomial in order to establish a covert communication 
channel for the exchange of information between malicious nodes. This type of attack is 
termed as a side channel communication. Other malicious nodes can now communicate 





same CRC polynomial. The surrounding nodes that are unaware of the use of a different 
CRC polynomial will interpret any frames from the malicious nodes as corrupted and 
thus making detection very difficult for this type of anomaly as it is seen as added noise. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
The amount of noise in a network is never constant which poses the first challenge in 
detection. If it were constant then it would be easy to detect the presence of side channel 
when there is an abnormal increase in corrupted frames. This is not the case because a 
baseline noise value cannot be determined for comparison due to the unpredictable 
nature of wireless communications. This is evident when a nearby microwave is turned 
on and all of a sudden the transmission rates between nodes come to almost a crawling 
stop due to a significant corruption of frames.  
 
 The next challenge of detection which stems from the type of network infrastructure 
that these side channels can coexist. These infrastructures usually lack a central monitor 
which increases the likelihood of errors when the communication medium is shared 
amongst its nodes. One infrastructure that possesses these characteristics and is of main 
interest in the field of side channel communication, is the Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
(MANETs). In this Mobile Ad Hoc environment detection becomes very hard when the 
only metric used is the frame error rate caused by noisy environments. It is very difficult 
to distinguish normal noise from intentionally corrupted frames that appear like noise. 
This calls on the need to find another metric that can be used to identify an intentionally 





that arises is how it can be validated. Once validated, how will this metric be used? In 
other words will it be used as an input into a well-known detection algorithm or will 





This thesis’s main contribution is to present the Hamming distance measure as a metric 
used for the detection of side channel communication. It also contributes a testing 
environment that could be used for any future work on the topic of side channel. As a 
consequence of the work in the testing environment, it also contributes to the existing 
literature on AirPcap and Wireshark with added knowledge on how to extract and format 
the data for custom use in MATLAB/Simulink simulation. Not only will this benefit any 
future work in this area but it will be very useful for any work done related to captured 
frame data. Another contribution is the insight into the use of the QualNet simulator that 
can be used as a starting point into future works.  
 
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
 
Chapter two provides background information on the MANET environment and the 
Cyclic Redundancy Check concept and also includes a survey of other types of side 
channels that are currently in the literature in hopes to give both similarities and more 
importantly the uniqueness of this thesis’s side channel problem. It also includes a survey 





process in discovering the Hamming distance as a metric for use in detection which 
includes some preliminary work in MATLAB/Simulink. The fourth chapter explores 
possible implementation of a test environment in both hardware and software. This 
includes looking into possible modification of existing network cards and also an 
evaluation of simulators such as NS-2, QualNet, Sinalgo and MATLAB/Simulink. 
Chapter four concludes with the introduction of a hybrid approach where real data 
captures are incorporated into simulation. This is done with the combination of the 
AirPcap network adapter, Wireshark and MATLAB/Simulink. The fifth chapter describes 
use of the hybrid approach introduced as the testing environment in the methodology in 
validating and evaluating the effectiveness of the Hamming distance as a metric for 
detection of side channel communication. This entails a detailed overview of the 
experimental setup and its parameters, the use of the Perceptron Learning Algorithm to 
validate that the Hamming distance is an effective feature able to distinguish between 
intentionally corrupted frames from naturally corrupted ones. Chapter five concludes by 
presenting possible scores that can be used to evaluate and measure the effectiveness of 
the Hamming distance metric. Chapter six explores the possibility of finding a 
generalizable effective Hamming distance threshold value that can be used to detect the 
presence of side channel. The final chapter concludes the thesis by quickly revisiting the 
contributions and confirming that they have been delivered. This also contains a critical 
review of the thesis for possible weakness that may suggest future works to supplement 








2    Background and Related Works  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a better understanding of the components 
that make up the problem and its environment. It allows a more detailed inspection into 
the components for easy comprehension of how they can be exploited even though some 
of them are not implemented in this thesis for testing. In particular the mobile and routing 
components are not implemented in testing. The reasoning for this will be offered later 
in Chapter four when the testing environment is explored. However, it is still advantages 
to offer a comprehensive review of these components in order to gain an understanding 
of the requirements that make up a real life side channel scenario for any future work. It 
also brings to light the feasibility of such exploitations when the environment is well 
known. The background section will start off with exploring the characteristics of 
MANETs, routing protocols and then move on to the concept of the Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC). The related works section that follows gives the reader a clear distinction 
between this work’s side channel problem and other works. 
 
2.1 Background – Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) consists of autonomous mobile nodes that have no 
fixed infrastructure and no centralized control [1]. This autonomous characteristic allows 
these nodes the freedom to connect and communicate with neighbouring nodes in radio 
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range on the fly [2]. These nodes can form a network without any type of base station 
registration, alluding to the fact that MANETs lack a static infrastructure with a 
centralized controller. Without a central controller these autonomous nodes must act as 
both the router and host [1]. This ability for MANETs to setup and tear down on the fly 
is an advantage when there is no existing infrastructure but also a disadvantage that 
exposes the network to some vulnerabilities. Roy [1] also identifies that the mobility 
model of MANETs are hard to be reproduce and that the topology is always changing 
and may degrade the performance which warrants the high possibility of errors. The 
limited capabilities of a node’s wireless radio only being able to either send or receive at 
one given time coupled with the challenges of sharing the communication medium also 
becomes an issue [1]. In order to mitigate the number of errors in transmission through 
overcoming the challenging physical aspects of MANETs, protocols must be put into 
place. Generic to all wireless protocols, MANETs also have the physical (PHY) and Data 
Link layers protocols in place to detect corrupted frames and limit the number of errors 
[3]. These errors are measured in bit error rates or frame error rates [3]. Included in the 
Data Link layer is the Media Access Control (MAC) Layer. The MAC layer is responsible 
for coordinating the sharing of the communication channel and implements error 
detecting mechanism that appends Frame Check Sequence (FCS) to any outgoing frame 
while the PHY layer establishes the connection [3]. The FCS is derived from applying the 
CRC generator function on the frame payload [3]. Once the CRC is calculated and 
appended to the FCS, the integrity of the frame sent can be evaluated by calculating the 
CRC on the frame payload at the receiving end. The CRC is calculated using the 
remainder from the division of the frame payload with a CRC generator function [3]. The 
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CRC concept will be reviewed in more detail later. Another important facet to look into 
is the type of routing protocol used for MANETs, as the topology is frequently changing. 
This will help to answer how nodes in a MANET are able to join and leave dynamically 
without any type of base station registration. It will also help to define the routing 
protocol used for future testing and implementation. 
 
The dynamic topology nature of MANETs coupled with its limited resources, 
poses a challenge in finding an efficient and reliable routing protocol that will cater to it. 
The reason being is that existing routing protocols that can be found in Ethernet based 
LANS are sufficient to perform routing in MANETS but Kumaar et al. [4] warn that they 
may be vulnerable to attacks. These attacks are due to the fact that MANETs have no 
secure boundaries and thus allow the ability for compromised nodes to threaten the 
integrity of a network with no centralized management and limited power supply [4]. 
Abolhasan et al. [5] describes two types of routing algorithm that exist for current LANs 
which are link-state and distance-vector. Both of these routing algorithms have periodical 
updates and consume large amounts of bandwidth to keep track of these tables [5]. This 
is not ideal for MANETs as they are limited to resources such as power and memory 
space. Abolhasan et al. [5] then identify three other types that are more scalable to 
MANETS that are global/proactive, on-demand/reactive and hybrid routing algorithms. 
The difference between proactive and reactive is determined by when the routes to all 
destinations are requested. Proactive routing converges at start up, while reactive only 
request routes when needed by the source node. Hybrid routing is the combination of 
both proactive and reactive. Based on these routing algorithms there a many protocols 
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developed and implemented in different network environments. The one that is 
appropriate for the MANETs is the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) that 
combines the link-state information storage scheme and the route update efficiency of 
proactive routing algorithm [5]. The efficiency of the proactive routing relies on limiting 
the number of route broadcast by only updating the link-state information when there is 
a topology changes. OLSR does this by electing certain nodes for rebroadcast duty when 
a topology change has occurred [5]. This limits the use of available bandwidth. 
Understanding the routing behaviour of MANETs is important in order to account for 
possible unknown variables that could be overlooked during future testing.  
 
2.2 Background – Cyclic Redundancy Checks 
 
The CRC bits that are added to the FCS field of a frame are the result of the remainder 
when dividing the data payload polynomial with the CRC polynomial. For example, if 
the CRC polynomial was 𝑥𝑥3 +  𝑥𝑥 + 1 and the data payload was  𝑥𝑥7 + 𝑥𝑥4 + 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑥𝑥 . The 
CRC polynomial becomes the divisor and the payload becomes the dividend. Both these 
polynomials are converted to binary format first before binary division is performed. 
Since the CRC value is the remainder, instead of dividing both these binary values a 
modulo operation can be performed instead. 
 
Modulo Operation example: 
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 This CRC value is then appended to the end of the frame before it is transmitted. At the 
receiver side the remainder is calculated in the same way and compared with the CRC 
that was appended from the sender. Normally in hardware this is done on a very low 
level using feedback shift registers [6]. In the hardware implementation the data must 
first be serialized and process bit-by-bit per clock cycle. When software solutions that 
tried to mimic this bit-by-bit processing, it was found to be very slow and it consumed 
too many resources. Sarwate et al. [6] describe a method of implementing the CRC code 
in software. The method takes advantage of the ability of computers to handle pre-
computed blocks of bits and store them into look-up tables. The idea comes from the 
known fact that the remainder of a given divisor and dividend is always going to be the 
same [6]. In other words, the remainder for all combinations of blocks bits and CRC 
polynomial bits are pre-computed and stored in the lookup table. This saves time during 
runtime because as the block of bits are encountered in the message payload, only a 
lookup is needed to find its corresponding remainder value. The question now to ask is 
whether or not the CRC polynomial makes a difference in error detection. The answer to 
that question is that not all CRC polynomials are created equal.  
 
Koopman and Chakravarty [7] try to shed some light on the effectiveness of 
detecting errors in using different CRC polynomials. Even though the use of these CRC 
codes have helped to detect transmission error, there is no guarantee that during 
transmission certain bits have been flipped in such a combination that at the receiver end 
the calculation produces an identical CRC sent [7]. They also suggest that a well-known 
CRC polynomial used for calculation in one application may not be as effective in 
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another. This suggest that the effectiveness can be measured and are different for every 
CRC polynomial. They identify that measure of how effective a CRC polynomial is, can 
be calculated by finding the Hamming distance which measures the minimum number 
of bit flips required to make an error undetectable [7]. Due to the nature of wireless 
transmission it is easier and more likely that one or two bits will be flipped and based on 
this assumption the Higher the Hamming distance the better the CRC polynomial for that 
particular application [7]. The other way a CRC polynomial can differ from one another 
is the size. 
 
Let’s first explore CRC polynomial of degree 16. Baicheva et al. [8] try to compare 
different existing 16-bit CRC polynomial and identify the ones with the best performance 
in terms of detecting errors. The advantage to these 16-bit CRC code polynomials is that 
they are a lot smaller and therefore easier and quicker to calculate. Each different CRC 
polynomial is given a probability metric called the probability of undetected channel 
errors denoted by Pud  [8]. This Pud  is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the different 16-
bit CRC codes. After performing the test on the selected 16-bit CRC codes, it was found 
that shortening the codes does affect the error detection performance [8]. In other words 
CRC codes that had a low order degree had poor Pud. Switching over to CRC polynomial 
of degree 32 explored in the work of Philip Koopman [9] where he tries to find an ideal 
32-bit CRC polynomial that will be effective for any message payload. He tries to fill the 
gap in the academic community by evaluating available CRC polynomials for different 
message payloads and their resulting Hamming distance (HD). He notes that if one were 
to test the effectiveness of a CRC code each time for a particular message payload it would 
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be too computationally expensive and so he tries to classify beforehand the ones that may 
best be suited for a particular situation [9].  After performing exhaustive exploration 
Koopman [9] present his results, which classifies each well-known CRC polynomial in a 
table with corresponding best match message payload size and the corresponding HD 
result. His result show that that the best error detection CRC code was a 32-bit CRC 
polynomial which he coined as the Koopman polynomial. From this work it is clear to 
see why 32-bit CRC polynomials are used as a standards for many applications. This also 
alludes to future work that could explore the idea of finding CRC polynomials that would 
be better suited for intentionally corrupting frames for the purpose of side channel 
communication. Going one step further, it may suggest that using a poor error detecting 
CRC polynomial may help hide the presence of side channel communication. 
 
2.3 Related Works – Other Types of Side Channels 
 
Steganography is a Greek word meaning covered writing [2]. This is different from 
encryption because steganography deals with hiding the secret messages from untrained 
eyes and encryption deals with masking or converting the secret message in a way that 
it is unreadable. Steganography or information hiding dates back to 440 B.C. where the 
Greeks used to tattoo secret messages on the messengers body with wax [2]. The main 
goal is to hide the presence of communication between the two parties. This is a one of 
the key characteristics of the side channel presented in this thesis.  
 
Another great example of information hiding comes from the British. They were 
able to hide dots and microdots strategically placed in newspaper publications [2]. This 
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type of distribution of the secret message provided almost zero percentage for detection 
because to the normal reader would attribute these ink spots to the printing press 
markings [2]. Since then the field of Steganography has advanced and the techniques 
have been sculpted into many forms such as text, images, audio, video and importantly 
protocols. The key is to be able to exploit the characteristics and vulnerabilities of these 
forms in order to hide information [2]. This type of protocol steganography can also be 
referred to as a side channel. The common factor between all types of network 
infrastructures is that they are based upon the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model 
concept, which is made up of protocol layers communicating in a hierarchical stack. This 
hints to the notion that exploitation of one or more of these protocol stacks can create and 
establish side channel communication in existing network infrastructure. 
 
Handel et al. [10] states that these side channels already exist in existing networks 
and warn that these channels can be inadvertently over looked and that administrators 
should be aware of them. In order to get a better understanding of possible types of side 
channels within the OSI model, it is advantages to look into a few, mainly the first two 
layers which relate closely the scope of this thesis work. Starting off with the first layer 
which is identified as the physical layer, two possible side channels can be created [10]. 
Due to the fact that this layer is the lowest level and deals with physical electrical signal 
processing devices, the side channel comes from exploiting these signal patterns. 
Specifically hiding the secret packet transmission by disguising it as legitimate signals or 
signal patterns [10]. The first type of side channel in the Physical Layer exploits normal 
signal patterns exhibit by different transmission protocols. For example during the 
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transmission control protocol (TCP) handshake, the signal should exhibit a signal pattern 
signature that contains fixed length signals in a specific sequence [10]. These patterns can 
then be exploited and imitated for use in to disguise secret data transmission to look like 
legitimate protocol signals.  
 
Another type of side channel in the physical layer exploits the carrier sense 
multiple access with collision detection protocol (CSMA/CD) [10]. In this scenario the 
side channel is created by using other legitimate signals as a “piggy back” to carry the 
secret data. The idea is that by using the CSMA/CD protocol, any adversary nodes 
attached to this physical layer are able to identify when a collision has occurred because 
a “back off” signal has been issued characterized by the protocol [10]. This can be 
exploited to identify when a normal node is intending to transmit. When this time is 
determined, an adversary node can “piggy back” the transmitted signal by timing its own 
signal transmission just after or before the legitimate signal [10].  
 
Now going up to layer two called the Data Link Layer, where unused frame space 
in the headers are exploited. Secret data can be hidden in these spaces and adversary 
nodes can modify their header checking algorithms to identify modified headers in those 
specific locations for intentionally hidden information [10]. Within this layer also exist 
error-handling protocol that use header space that could also be exploited. Both Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) and Local Area Networks (LANs) are based on the OSI 
network model and thus contain vulnerabilities that provide possibilities for side channel 
communication. Note that all of these side channel examples are unique in their own way 
13 
 
2. Background and Related Works 
but at the same time have the same underlying purpose of hiding the presence of secret 
data as opposed to encryption where the focus is to modify the data so that it’s unreadable 
to the untrained eye. This is where each of these side channels are similar to the side 
channel presented here in this thesis.   
 
Earlier works by K. Szczypiorski [11] have shown that side channel 
communication is possible by the exploitation of existing protocols within wireless and 
Ethernet environments. He proposed a way of creating a network steganography channel 
method that uses the vulnerabilities of the infrastructure. This is apart from the usual 
already seen Steganography methods such as hiding information in pictures, audio or 
video. Szczypiorski [11] terms this type of hidden channel or system as a Hidden 
Communication system for Corrupted Networks (HICCUPS). The idea behind this is to 
have a group of nodes that can communicate with each other using a predetermine way 
of intentionally corrupting a frames FCS fields. HICCUPS use the fact that any corrupted 
packets received are automatically dropped without question for efficiency purposes 
[11]. These groups of node will have to agree on a method of corrupting the frame in 
order to recover the frame for use. The author suggests using keys to encrypt the FCS to 
disguise it as being in error when the unknowing receiver node calculates the checksum. 
The other nodes outside the group not aware of the predetermined method of 
intentionally corrupting the frame will see that the frame is in error and will attribute it 
as noise. This idea is very much the bases of the side channel presented in this thesis. 
However this thesis explores a different method of intentionally corrupting the FCS field 
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using a predetermined CRC polynomial function. This methods avoids the difficult tasks 
of key exchange for use in the encryption algorithm which is a research topic on its own.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the noise prone MANET environment would prove to be 
the best facility for this type of channel to exist but it can also be seen in a wired Ethernet 
Local area network (LAN) infrastructure. Jankowski et al. [12] proposed a way of creating 
a side channel within an Ethernet LAN infrastructure using improper Ethernet frame 
padding, address resolution protocol (ARP) and transmission control protocol (TCP) 3-
way handshake. The LAN infrastructure does prove to offer a feature that MANETs do 
not have, which allows adversary nodes to identify other nodes that are fellow 
adversaries. This is done through the broadcasting ARP packets with improper frame 
padding. The padding bits is comprise of a random number not equaling to zero and the 
hash value of the medium access control (MAC) address based on the random number 
as the key. If there are other adversaries in the group they will broadcast their ARP packet 
with their random number and hash value in the padding bits. In order to perform the 
secret data transfer, the TCP segment packets are used with improper frame padding. 
The node that wants to initiate side channel communication will send a normal TCP 
segment request without improper frame padding directly to the other adversary node 
[12]. That adversary node will send an acknowledgement (ACK) back but this time it will 
improperly pad the frame with the secret message. The communication continues with 
exchange of ACK improperly padded segment packets. The sequences of TCP packet are 
exactly the same as normal 3-way handshake and to the outside observer this is seen as 
normal traffic. The author named this type of side channel communication “PadSteg” 
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[12]. This work helps identify that side channel does not limit itself to only wireless but 
may also exist in wired environments. This may help present possible future work that 
could take the side channel concept presented in this thesis and apply it in a wired 
environment. The natural question that arises is, if it is more easily detected due the 
centralized characteristics of the wired environment.  
 
2.4 Related Works – Anomaly Detection Systems 
 
The issue with having this unique side channel problem is lack of literature that is directly 
related to the detection.  This section allows the reader to gain some insight into other 
types of side channels or attacks on a network and their countermeasures used to detect 
them. It acts as more of a general overview of the techniques and metric available for 
possible adaptation or implementation for detection specific to this thesis. 
 
 Most of the literature surveyed looked at intrusion detection systems that guard 
against Ethernet LAN based attacks. Zhang et al. [13] identify that there must be a 
distinction between wired and wireless based networks when it comes to the techniques 
used in intrusion detection. In other words, the techniques tried tested and true in a wired 
network cannot be ported over to MANETs. The main challenges that cause this un-
portability stem from the decentralized and dynamic topology infrastructure of a 
MANET as mentioned before. In order for intrusion detection to work, the system must 
be able to find a normalcy state of network and be able to pin point an anomaly has been 
detected [13]. In order to discover a normal network state, the network data of the whole 
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network must be collected and analyzed [13]. In order for the intrusion detection system 
to be effective this network data must be collected in real-time with minimal delay.  
 
Zhang et al. [13] identified that due to the decentralized infrastructure of MANETs 
this real-time traffic collection is not possible. This can only be done if the infrastructure 
is able to funnel or process data through a single gateway or end point [13]. Wired 
networks have this advantage where routers, gateways, firewalls and switches can 
become a centralized real-time data collector [13]. Instead the real-time traffic in MANETs 
is limited to collection by individual nodes that are within range of the communication 
traffic. This limits the capabilities of existing intrusion detection systems for use in 
MANETs [13]. In order to circumvent this data collection limitation, Zhang et al. [13] 
propose that there must be a cooperative detection system in place with groups of trusted 
nodes. These nodes must participate in intrusion detection notification by running local 
node-based algorithms [13]. The main feature of the algorithm is being able to calculate 
the level of confidence that there is an intrusion occurring based on its network data 
collected within range of its radio [13]. This shed some light into the challenges of 
working with MANETs versus Ethernet based LANs. It also identifies that existing 
intrusion detection techniques are more catered to a cooperative model which is found 
mostly in the Ethernet based LANS environment. This leaves some room for the 
discovery of new techniques and metrics that can be used in the MANET environment 





2. Background and Related Works 
Another form of anomaly detection is in the work of Hayajneh et al. [14] where 
they look into detecting the presence of malicious behaviours such as packet dropping 
and energy draining by nodes in wireless ad hoc networks. This malicious behaviour is 
plausible due to the combination of greedy nodes trying to limit power consumption and 
the lack of a central control center in wireless ad hoc networks [14]. Each node within the 
wireless ad hoc network relies on its neighbouring nodes to participate fairly in the 
forwarding of packets to reach their destinations. The threat model is based on the 
exploitation of the cooperative properties of nodes within the wireless ad hoc network 
infrastructure in order to perform two types of malicious behaviours [14]. The first of the 
two is malicious packet dropping (MD) after acknowledging receipt of the packet from 
the sender but does not forward the packet [14]. The motive to become uncooperative in 
forwarding these packets could its greedy nature to conserve power. The second type is 
similar to the first but without the presence of receipt acknowledgement, causing the 
sender nodes to retransmit, which may cause unnecessary energy drainage denoted by 
ED [14]. This type of behaviour does not have a meaningful purpose, but only to interfere 
with normal operations of nodes within the network [14]. 
 
Hayajneh et al. [14] then presented a five-step process that make up the detection 
protocol that the sending node can follow to determine possible malicious behaviour 
amongst its neighbours. The earlier step of the protocol tries to achieve a baseline sense 
of the network conditions through determining the probability of channel errors using 
pre-calculated signal to noise ratio (SNR) and channel errors based on counting the 
number of request to send (RTS) to clear to send (CTS) [14]. The assumption that the 
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authors had made is that if small RTS and CTS control packets that were sent within a 
window are corrupted, then the larger data packets sent within this window will also be 
corrupted with a high probability [14]. If acknowledgements are not received, the sending 
node can determine the likelihood that the receiving node is malicious and behaving in 
an ED manner by using the two network condition probability metrics stated above, even 
if indications suggest that packet corruption is low. As an aside this assumption is 
confirmed in the work of Xu et al. [15] where they try to find the effectiveness of using 
RTS and CTS handshakes in MANETs. They suggest that the existing RTS and CTS 
handshake that was put in place to mitigate medium sharing issues is not as effective as 
it was thought. They identify that the power needed to send out an RTS is lower than the 
power of successfully transmitting a packet. Xu et al. [15] also point out that the RTS 
power is enough to disrupt a transmitting packet. If there is a hidden node in range of 
the receiver and not in range of the sender, the RTS request sent by this hidden node will 
cause a collision with the packet. Xu et al. [15] suggest that instead of using RTS and CTS 
packets to limit the number of collisions, it more beneficial to measure the signal power 
of the RTS request. This is a better indicator as this measure power could be used to 
decide if it is enough power based on a threshold to successfully receive a packet. This 
confirms the work of Hayajneh et al. [14] as it identifies that the likelihood of a packet 
being corrupted naturally in transmission is low if the number of RTS and CTS are 
received without error as it takes less power to transmit them as Xu et al. [15] showed. 
Now to continue with detection of MD behaviour, the sending node must employ the 
help from surrounding nodes along with the two network conditions measures [14]. 
From the point of view of the sending node, it may have a false sense that its packets are 
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received without error and assumes that they are being forwarded when it receives 
acknowledgments. In actuality, the malicious node receiving the packets continues to 
send acknowledgements of receiving such packets, but do not forward them. In order to 
detect this type of MD behaviour, the sending nodes must depend on other nodes to 
watch for the forwarding of the packets that were acknowledged and accounted for [14]. 
The probability of both of these malicious behaviours, ED and MD, is calculated to a value 
the authors called Pm. If this Pm value is calculated and goes beyond a threshold, then the 
alarm is triggered. The concern here stems from how sensitive the detection protocol is 
based on the probability in packet corruption and channel errors. This suggests that if the 
wireless ad hoc network contains a very large amount of nodes, this will create more 
interference and noise, making detection very hard as the intentional packet dropping by 
the malicious node may be mistaken as normal due to the network conditions. This 
advocates that this detection protocol is only good for low interference, low noise wireless 
ad hoc networks. This is very similar to the problem that is posed here in this thesis 
because legitimate error can be used as a cover for side channel communication. It is now 
beneficial to briefly explore some prior works that addresses detection of the side channel 
that is related to this thesis. 
 
Unlike intrusion detection, anomaly detection cannot base its features or metrics 
on abnormal usage behaviour patterns or profiles [16]. In the attempt of creating an 
intrusion detection system model, Denning [16] has listed some types of intrusions that 
could be alerted by abnormal usage patterns or profile. These include attempted break-
in, masquerading/successful break-in, penetration by legitimate user, leakage by 
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legitimate user, inference by legitimate user, Trojan horse, virus, and denial-of-service 
[16]. In all these intrusion examples usage pattern can be compared to normal usage or 
legitimate users or processes [16]. For example, denial-of-service can be detection by very 
high activity or access to resources by a particular user when all other activity by other 
users are low [16]. Detection of the side channel anomaly does not have the same luxury 
of having a behavioural norm to compare with. As described, these side channel frames 
can hide itself amongst legitimate corrupted frames and becomes difficult to distinguish 
when the MANET environment is unpredictable and normally is prone to errors. This 
confirms that existing intrusion detection features or metric that exist cannot be directly 
transferred in the use for detection of the side channel and shows the need for new 
features and metrics to be discovered.  
 
Li et al. [17] proposed the use of the frame error rate (FER) as a metric for detection 
of side channel. The idea was to measure the FER within a time window and if there is 
an abnormal increase in errors within that window then this may signal the presence of 
side channel [17]. The only issue is that the error still cannot be confidently identified as 
a side channel frames or legitimate errors cause by some change in the environment. 
Work done by Madtha et al. [18] proposed measuring Request to Send (RTS) and Clear 
to Send (CTS) control frames as a way of detecting side channel communication. The 
assumption made was that before every data frame was sent a RTS and CTS combination 
must be sent and received in order to avoid collision [18]. That means that for every data 
frame sent there will be corresponding RTS/CTS frame [18]. If there was no error in 
transmission the number of data frames will match the number of RTS/CTS frames 
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counted [18]. Conversely, if there was error in the transmission the number of data frames 
will be less than the number of RTS/CTS frames counted because the data frames would 
be seen as error [18]. The hypothesis that abnormally high RTS frames with low data 
frames will signal the presence of side channel communication because the side channel 
frames would be seen as error [18]. Again this metric is sensitive to real noise that can 
occur which could cause a high increase in the number of RTS frames compared to the 
data frames. Even though both of these prior metrics are sensitive to error that can occur 
naturally in an error prone environment, they are still very useful and can be used in 
combination with other metrics such as the Hamming distance metric proposed in this 
thesis. It is also important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of existing 






3    Hamming Distance as a Detection 
Metric 
 
One of the challenges when trying to come up with an anomaly detection algorithm or 
system for any domain specific problem is finding features or metrics that can be used 
that uniquely identify an anomaly. As it was seen in Chapter two, some metrics have 
been proposed in prior works that also explored detection of this specific side channel 
but they proved to be sensitive to certain factors that exist in normal wireless 
environments. This Chapter starts off with some insight into the motivations that led to 
the discovery of the Hamming distance as a possible metric for use in the detection and 
finally, include an explanation on how it could be used. 
 
3.1 The Delta Cyclic Redundancy Check Metric 
 
The direction towards the discovery of the Hamming distance as a metric can be 
accredited to an unpublished survey written by a colleague Dr. John K. Jacoub which 
compared existing anomaly detection algorithms and techniques.  At the end of the 
survey he provided some very early preliminary work that proposed a technique which 
was investigated further in this thesis. The technique proposed was based on the 
hypothesis that each CRC polynomial when used in the CRC generator function would 
map to its own set of CRC values and if the numerical difference between two values 
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within the set were taken then it would yield a significantly different result than the 
difference between two values out of the set. He termed this difference value as the delta 
CRC (Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶). If these Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 values are plotted and the CRC values come from different 
CRC polynomial functions then there should be two distinct clusters. Let’s redefine the 
hypothesis in a side channel scenario: 
 
Let’s first define the following for purpose of reference: 
• There exist two CRC polynomials called G and H  
• There also exist some frame data defined in the form: 
o anxn + … + a2x2  + a1x1 + a0x0 , where 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 ∈ {0,1} ∀ 𝑘𝑘 ∈ ℤ , 1 ≤ 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑛𝑛 and, 
o n is the highest degree of the polynomial 
• And, 
o CRCG = (anxn + … + a2x2  + a1x1 + a0x0) mod G | 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝐴𝐴 , where 𝐴𝐴 ⊂  ℤ 
o CRCH = (anxn + … + a2x2  + a1x1 + a0x0) mod H | 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝐵𝐵 , where 𝐵𝐵 ⊂  ℤ 
• And A and B are disjointed sets such that 𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝐵 =  ∅, where ∅ is the empty set 
 
Then based on the proposed hypothesis, if polynomial G is used by all normal nodes in 
a MANET then the adversary node uses polynomial H to purposely corrupt the frames 
in order to create the side channel. All unsuspecting normal nodes will see all frames that 
are coming from the adversary node as corrupted because the calculated CRCG will not 
match the received CRCH. However if the nodes were smarter and could perform Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
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List of possible outcomes: 
1. The frame was determined to be without error, then calculated CRCG value and 
the CRCG value received in the frame would match and the Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 result would be 
0. 
2. The frame was determined to be with error, meaning the calculated and the 
received CRC in the frame did not match, then there are two possible outcomes.  
2a. The frame data was naturally corrupted, then the calculated CRCG value 
minus the CRCG value received in the frame will not be 0 but yield a Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 
closely resembling elements in the set A. 
2b. The frame data is fine but the FCS field is purposely corrupted and contains 
the CRCH value which was calculated by some unknown polynomial H, 
then the calculated CRCG value minus the received CRCH value in the 
frame will not be 0 but yields a Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 that are significantly different then 
elements of both A or B. 
 
If both outcomes 2a and 2b were plotted this would yield a cluster of elements that closely 
resembles elements in set A and elements that are significantly different then elements of 
both A or B which would indicate the presence of a side channel. More specifically, the 
existence of adversary nodes using a different unknown CRC polynomial H to purposely 
corrupt its frame before transmission. If the above statements in the hypothesis can be 
proven to be true then the Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 can be used as a very effective metric for detection of 
side channel. In order to test this hypothesis a simulation was created in 
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MATLAB/Simulink [19] that reproduced the above scenario using real life CRC32 
polynomials. 
 
Let’s first entertain that the hypothesis is true, then running a simulation that 
produces the outcomes describe above will yield two distinct clusters which in a 
histogram will produce two different peeks. MATLAB/Simulink was used to test this 
hypothesis and the simulation can be seen in Figure 3.1 below. Note that the 





Figure 3.1  MATLAB/Simulink Simulation for Testing Delta CRC Hypothesis 
 
 The simulation starts from the far left where the Bernoulli Binary generates 100000 
frames of size 1024 bits. The number of frames can be specified by modifying the 
simulation stop time at the top of the model window. One frame will be generated per 
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one second simulation time and is copied three times for input into three CRC generator 
paths in section 1. Generator labelled “CRCG-Sender” uses the default CRC32 
polynomial 0x04C11DB7 to generator a CRC value and tags it on to the end of the frame. 
The frames that go through this generator will simulate a frame that will be transmitted. 
Generator “CRCH-Koopman” uses another CRC32 polynomial 0x741B8CD7 and any 
frames that go through this generator will simulate a transmitted side channel frame that 
is purposely corrupted. Generator “CRCG-Verify” is used as a verifier and also uses the 
default CRC32 polynomial. The CRC value generated will be used at the end of the 
simulation to compare with the other generated CRC values from the other two frame 
paths. Section 2 has two Binary Symmetric Channels which simulate frames being 
transmitted with probability of being erroneous. Channel 1 handles all the non-side 
channel frames transmitted while channel 2 handles all the side channel frames. 
Remember that the frames that go into these channels are the same frames but have 
different CRC values. Section 3 has three selectors that are used to pick out desired bits 
from the whole frame. Selector 2 and 3 both pick out the CRC bits that were tagged to the 
end of the frame and send it off for Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 calculation in section 5 of the simulation. 
Selector 1 has a different task, it will pick out the data portion of the frame (1024 bits) and 
send it to another CRC generator module labelled “CRCG-Receiver” in section 4. This 
section 4 simulates the receiving nodes task of recalculate the CRC value using the same 
CRC32 default in order to see if the frame has been corrupted naturally through 
transmission. The selector 4 in this section 4 will now pick out the CRC value and also 
send it off for Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 calculation in section 5. The Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 calculation is handled by both the 
XOR logical operators which will perform binary subtraction on the CRC values inputted. 
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Logical operator 1 calculates the Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 values for the non-side channel frames performing 
the binary subtraction on CRC values that were calculated using the default CRC.  
Referring back to the outcomes listed above, the Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 outcomes would be 0 for frame 
with no error or not 0 if the frame was naturally corrupted. The Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 outcome described 
in bullet 2b from above is calculated in logical operator 2 when the CRC value generated 
form the default CRC polynomial is binary subtracted from the CRC values generated 
from the koopman CRC polynomial. All the resulting Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶s are outputted to the 
workspace “DeltaCRC_notSC” and “DeltaCRC_SC” for plotting. Remember that if the 
hypothesis holds true then there will a distinct peaks for “DeltaCRC_notSC” and one for 
“DeltaCRC_SC”. The resulting histogram of the CRC values plotted for each generated 
frame can be seen below in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Delta CRC Hypothesis Testing Results. (a) CRC values generated by the Default 
polynomial and (b) CRC values generated by the Koopman polynomial 
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Figure 3.2 shows histogram of both Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 for both non-side channel (left) and side 
channel frames (right) on separate graphs. If the hypothesis was true, there should be two 
clear peaks seen. What is actually seen is that the CRC values seem to be distributed 
evenly for both polynomials. Note that the results here are from using CRC32 Default 
and Koopman and cannot be generalized to other unknown CRC polynomials. 
Unfortunately, these CRC32 polynomials are standards that are known to be used in real 
implementation and the hypothesis have to hold true for at least these CRC polynomials. 
The same scenario was ran but this time substituting the Koopman CRC polynomial for 
Castagnoli and it yielded the same results. Further work could be done to find CRC 
polynomials that could possess the desired characteristics describe above to prove the 
hypothesis to be true but this is outside the scope of this thesis and is left as possible 
future work. 
 
3.2 The Hamming Distance Metric 
 
Taking the same direction but instead of finding the numerical difference of two different 
CRC values the idea was to take the Hamming distance instead. The Hamming distance 
is a common metric used in code theory to compare two different bit strings [20]. The 
Hamming distance measures the number bits that are different between the two bit 
strings [20]. What is interesting about the Hamming distance is that it is commonly used 
for error correction [20]. A method called the “nearest neighbor decoding” uses the 
Hamming distance to figure out what possible code word was sent if the received code 
word was in error [20]. This method states that the code word that was sent but was in 
error can be identified by the smallest Hamming distance value between the error code 
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work and all its possible code words [20]. This is under the assumption that the channel 
is not that noisy [20]. This assumption is a valid one to make as there would be no point 
to communicate if the channel is so noisy mostly all the frames are lost. Even for an 
adversary a noisy channel is not ideal when trying to move data around. This assumption 
that the number of bits flip are minimal during transmission paired with the knowledge 
that CRC polynomials are hash functions designed to avoid as many collisions as 
possible, sparked the idea of using Hamming distance as a possible metric for detection 
of side channel frames. A proposed way of detecting these intentionally corrupted side 
channel frames would still be the same as before which was looking into the CRC values 
and comparing the difference between the received value and the calculated value but 
instead measure the Hamming distance (HD) between the two CRC bit strings. The new 
hypothesis to test would be that the HD value of a naturally corrupted is significantly 
low compared to an intentionally corrupted frame. This is under the following 
assumptions: 
 
1. The CRC polynomial used is one that is known and used in real implementation 
such as the Default, Koopman or Castagnoli describe earlier. 
2. The adversary will not use encryption or change the integrity of the frame data 
and the only portion that is different is the FCS containing the CRC value 
generated by a different CRC polynomial. 
 
The MATLAB/Simulink model, shown in Figure 3.3 was modified to test using the 
Hamming distance metric instead of the Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. It was also modified to include the 
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Castagnoli CRC32 polynomial as well as changing the output to the workspace as a CRC 
bit string instead of the numerical values for use in the HD comparisons. Note that the 
configuration settings of each of the module is the same as the model from Figure 3.1 and 




Figure 3.3 MATLAB/Simulink Simulation for Testing Hamming Distance Metric Hypothesis 
 
The purpose of the simulation model in Figure 3.3 is to test two things. One is to confirm 
that during transmission the number of flip bits throughout the frame is going to be 
minimal. Assuming that the channel should not be too noisy or no nodes will be able to 
communicate properly including the adversary nodes. The other is to confirm the 
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variability of the CRC values generated by the three different CRC polynomials which is 
the consequence of the hashing function characteristics that was mentioned earlier. 
Instead of verifying the variability of the numerical values of each CRC value produced, 
the Hamming distance variability will be measured between the values generated by the 
different CRC polynomials. In other words, measure the number of bit differences 
between the bit strings produced by the default CRC versus Koopman and Castagnoli. If 
each bit string produced by each CRC polynomial is very different to avoid collisions 
then the HD values between each of them will be very high. Higher with respect to the 
HD value obtained between a naturally corrupted CRC bit string versus an uncorrupted 
bit string generated by the same CRC polynomial. If both these test are confirmed true 
then there is a good chance that the hypothesis is true that the HD value of a naturally 
corrupted frame is significantly lower compared to an intentionally corrupted frame 
using a different CRC polynomial. Now let’s define some of the variables that are 
outputted to the workspaces: 
 
a. DNE (Default No Error): CRC bit generated by default CRC32 polynomial. 
b. DE (Default Error): CRC bit generated by default CRC32 polynomial but in error. 
c. KNE (Koopman No Error): CRC bit generated by Koopman CRC32 polynomial. 
d. KE (Koopman Error): CRC bit generated by Koopman CRC32 polynomial but in error. 
e. CNE (Castagnoli No Error): CRC bit generated by Castagnoli CRC32 polynomial. 
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With those variables defined, the following HD comparisons were made: 
1. DNE vs DE 
2. DNE vs KNE  
3. DNE vs KE  
4. DNE vs CNE 
5. DNE vs CE 
 
 The first comparison yields the HD values when the possibility of natural corruption 
is added to a frame where the default CRC32 polynomial was used to generate its CRC 
bit string. Consequently, because the CRC bits strings are calculated on the same frame 
data and using the same polynomial then the frames that are not in error will have a HD 
value of zero. Conversely, the only case where the HD is greater than zero is when the 
frame was naturally corrupted. Comparisons 2 and 3 produces HD values between CRC 
bit strings generated by the default polynomial versus CRC bit strings generated by 
Koopman polynomial. The difference is comparison 3 adds the possibility of natural 
corruption. The last two comparisons 4 and 5 are identical to 2 and 3 but instead use the 
Castagnoli polynomial. Intuitively, the HD value produced for these last four cases 
should be greater than zero because the use of the a different CRC should guarantee that 
at least one bit in the CRC bit strings is different otherwise they would be the same. In 
order to test this the model in Figure 3.3 is run with two variables. The first one is the size 
of the frame and the second is the number of frames generated. The size was varied from 
512 bits to 2048 bits with increments of 512 bits (512, 1024, 1536, 20148) to see if the HD 
was affected by the size of the frame. The number of frames used was fixed to 1,000,000. 
33 
 
3. Hamming Distance as a Detection Metric 
In order efficiently process a large amount of frames, a MATLAB script was developed 
that calculated the statistical measures such as the mean, median, mode, variance, 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation. This MATLAB script can be found in the 
Appendix A for further reference. Mostly all of these statistical measure are familiar 
except for coefficient of variation which might need to be defined. The coefficient of 
variation is a ratio of standard deviation to mean (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
). It gives context to 
infer meaning out of the resulting standard deviation. In other words it answers the 
question of how well the resulting standard deviation represents the spread or variability 
of the data with respect to the mean. The closer the coefficient of variation is to 1 then the 
greater the spread or variability of the data. The statistical result of the four simulation 
runs with different frame sizes can be found in the Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 below. 
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Analyzing the results of the simulation it can be seen that there is a significant 
average HD value difference between the CRC bit strings generated by the default 
polynomial versus both the Koopman and Castagnoli polynomials. The consensus 
35 
 
3. Hamming Distance as a Detection Metric 
between all four simulations is that the resulting HD seems to be averaging around 8 for 
DNEvsDE and all other comparisons 16. The most important thing to notice is that based 
on the low coefficient of variant values, the HD values are pretty uniformed. These results 
confirm with greater promise that the HD value of a naturally corrupted frame is 
significantly lower compared to an intentionally corrupted frame using a different CRC 
polynomial. Based on the experimental variables it is hard to confidently generalize the 
results to more real life scenarios. Even though these preliminary results look promising 







4    Hybrid Testing Environment  
 
The most challenging part about setting up a testing environment for this domain specific 
research area is the lack of existing real life implementation or protocols that supports the 
delivery of intentionally corrupted frames to form a side channel. The obvious direction 
is finding existing hardware or software solutions that may be modified to support side 
channel communication. In order to understand the direction and motivation in 
developing a test environment, let’s first explore some earlier works that surveyed 
suitable test environment to facilitate side channel communication. This is followed by 
some insight into preliminary work using the QualNet simulator which is intended to 
spark or supplement future work. Finally, an introduction and overview of the proposed 
hybrid testing environment is given for use in the validation and evaluation of the 
effectiveness the Hamming distance metric for detection. 
 
4.1 Hardware versus Software as a Test Environment 
 
In some earlier works, Najafizadeh et al. [21] discovered that it was not possible to 
implement side channel communication on the existing network cards that are based on 
wireless protocol standards 802.11. This was due to the fact that the FCS calculation found 
in the MAC Layer is hardwired into the communication chipset [21]. Making it 
impossible to change the CRC polynomial within the FCS calculation. However they do 
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reference an older discontinued network card model DWL-AG530 produced by D-Link 
that uses a chipset called the Atheros AR5212 which supports modifications to its MAC 
Layer [21]. This highlights the fact that it can be possible to custom build chipsets that do 
not follow standards and would allow for alterations of the CRC polynomial within the 
FCS calculation. Unfortunately due limited resources, implementing side channel 
communication in existing hardware that follow the 802.11 standards would be 
impossible for the purpose of testing in this thesis work. So the natural progression is to 
look into simulation as a software solution. The advantage to having a network simulator 
as a test environment is that it is scalable and it’s cheaper to modify software components 
than hardware components. Another advantage is that most of these network simulators 
are able to provide communication channel models, routing protocols and mobility 
models. The issue is finding one that can be modified to add the capabilities of side 
channel communication. Most simulators are event/message driven meaning that the 
concept of time is simulated. This means that the actual transportation of packets between 
nodes are simulated. In other words the time is advanced based on the calculated time 
for each packet to travel between nodes taking into account factors such as distance and 
size of the message. Alluding to the fact that the actual packet is never really sent which 
means that error occurring on the packet is also simulated based on the channel model 
probabilities implemented. For example if a packet is deemed to be in error based on the 
channel model, the actual frames bits do not reflect the corrupted bits, which confirms 
that these simulators do not have any concept of an FCS field for error handling. The 
other requirement is to be able to get access to the frame contents in order to include an 
FCS field for error handling. 
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 Some previous works have surveyed a number of simulators such as NS-2 [22], 
QualNet, Sinalgo and MATLAB/Simulink that will help as a starting point in finding an 
environment suitable to facilitate side channel communication.  Odor et al. [3] looked into 
simulators such as NS-2, QualNet and MATLAB/Simulink. They found that both NS-2 
and QualNet have the same stochastic model on handling frames that were found to be 
in error [3]. With some previous work in collaboration with DRDC, Odor et al. [3] did 
determine that they could not modify the frame error handling in NS-2 due to the 
difficulty of accessing the contents in the frame. However they did not mention any 
further work in QualNet to modify the frame error handling to facilitate the addition of 
side channel communication [3]. Odor et al. [3] also present some initial work with 
MATLAB/Simulink’s communication toolbox where they were able to implement a test 
environment that included all the requirements needed for side channel communication. 
This included a way to corrupt bits within the frames found to be in error by using the 
Rican Fading channel model [3]. This thesis explores further into both QualNet and 
MATLAB/Simulink as potential simulators. Najafizadeh et al. [21] used Sinalgo as their 
base simulator for their testing environment. The reasoning for choosing Sinalgo was that 
it was very well document and easy to modify [21].  Najafizadeh et al. [21] were able to 
successfully add an FCS field and implement a FCS generator function however the 
downfall of Sinalgo is that it does not come with a full network stack implemented; in 
particular it is missing the 802.11 CSMA/CA [21]. This required them to implement a 
simple communication model to reduce collisions [21]. Instead of fully implementing the 
802.11 CSMA/CA protocol, they opted to implement a communication strategy that 
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modelled after the poison distribution [21]. This served its purpose but still left room for 
finding another simulation that was more true to existing standards in real life 
communication which started further investigation into QualNet as a possible software 
solution. 
 
4.2 QualNet Network Simulator 
 
QualNet by Scalable Technologies [23] was very appealing as a potential candidate in 
providing a test environment because it offered characteristics and behaviours of a real 
life network. It includes capabilities that allow for any existing wireless hardware to be 
realized in the simulator by offering a large amount of customizable parameters and 
specifications within different available devices or nodes. It takes into account many 
different factors for its communication broadcasting model such as weather, terrain, 
distance, and radio strength. Many industry leaders in the communication business have 
used QualNet to test their own network infrastructure for scalability and reliability [23]. 
Through its scalability, large numbers of nodes can be added and simulated with results 
that closely mimic a real life network [23]. It also includes a mobility model where paths 
could be randomly generated or explicitly specified through way points. Along with this, 
it also supports all kinds of routing protocols including OLSR which was mentioned 
earlier as ideal for MANETs. One other favourable advantage of QualNet was that it 
offered a fully functional network protocol stack that mirrors the real life hardware 
protocol implementation which most other simulators did not [23]. The only downfall 
was that it did not provide any form of data output for offline processing and analysis. 
QualNet also only provided some minimal stats reporting that was printed to a file. 
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Despite this only downfall, as a whole QualNet appeared to allow for the most realistic 
modelling of the MANET environment to facilitate side channel communication. It is 
obvious that some modifications are still needed to be able simulate side channel 
communication for testing. 
 
 The initial modifications, in collaboration with DRDC, was comprised of adding data 
dump capabilities for offline processing and adding metrics such as dropped frames, 
good frames and frame error rates for a specified time window. This initial work was 
featured in the 2013 proceedings of the Military Modeling & Simulation Symposium 
called “A realistic implementation for simulating side channel in mobile ad hoc 
networks” [17]. The scope of that work was to investigate detection of side channel 
communication through measuring the frame error rate (FER) fluctuations [17]. This first 
implementation of side channel communication was done in the application layer 
focusing on the constant bit rate application (CBR) [17]. The CBR application code was 
modified so that for every second application link created from node to node, that link 
was marked as side channel communication [17]. The implementation of side channel 
communication in this way was in line with how QualNet handles frames in error which 
did not require the modification of the simulator’s original stochastic frame error handler 
mentioned earlier [17]. This served its purpose at the time as the only interest was on the 
number of frames in error and not how many bits in the frames were corrupted [17]. With 
the new scope of this thesis, further modifications to QualNet were needed to allow for a 
more realistic way of handling error frames. This would include the addition of an FCS 
field within the frame, the implementation of an FCS generator function based on any 
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CRC polynomial as input, and the ability to flip selected bits of the frame if it is deemed 
erroneous. The implementation was planned to have two sequential phases. The first 
phase was to implement the FCS generator function which includes the addition of an 
FCS field within the frame. The second phase was implementation of the function to flip 
bits in the frame if it is deemed erroneous. The first phase was completed but when tested 
with a simple two node scenario having one communication link, it failed only running 
a quarter of the way. After a considerable amount of time spent debugging and testing, 
the root cause of the issue was still found. This prompted the decision to stop any further 
modification of QualNet and set the focus on MATLAB/Simulink for setting up a testing 
environment. 
 
 As seen in the previous chapter describing the preliminary work in discovering the 
Hamming distance as a possible metric for detection of side channel communication and 
also work by Odor et al. [3], MATLAB/Simulink is capable of facilitating side channel 
communication. It does so by providing a communication toolbox that can be used to 
fulfilling the requirements outlined earlier, which included the addition of an FCS field 
within the frame, the implementation of an FCS generator function based on any CRC 
polynomial as input, and the ability to flip selected bits of the frame if it is deemed 
erroneous. The disadvantage of using this communication toolbox is that it cannot 
simulate multi-node scenarios because there is no 802.11 CSMA/CA to handle multiple 
communication links. So the capabilities is limited to one node generating fixed sized 
frames using the “Bernoulli Binary Generator” which can be seen at the far left in Figure 
3.2 in the previous chapter. As a consequence the idea of routing and mobility is not 
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available as only one sender and receiver node can technically be simulated. In turn this 
means that there is also no mobility model to allow for a MANET environment that was 
described earlier as being an ideal testing against side channel communication. For the 
preliminary work described in the previous chapter of discovering and evaluating the 
Hamming distance this implementation served its purpose. However in a real life 
scenario two things need to be realized, first is the type and size of frame will vary and 
second there are usually more than one node in a network. Another unrealistic 
implementation parameter not evident in the model in Figure 3.2 is the SNR value used 
by the “AWGN ” channel was set before runtime and the same value is used thorough 
out the simulation. In a real life situation this value could vary based on the signal to 
noise sensed from the network at that particular moment in time. This is important to 
understand because the SNR value will affect the number of possible bits being flipped 
in the frame, which in turn will directly affect the Hamming distance value. In order to 
keep the simulation as true to real life as possible some modifications to the original 
simulation model shown in Figure 3.2 is needed. 
 
4.3 The Hybrid Approach 
 
In order to encompass all the real life elements into the MATLAB/Simulink, a new hybrid 
approach had to be taken. This hybrid approach enlists the help of the AirPcap Network 
adapter [24] and Wireshark [25] to capture network data and frames. This includes data 
from multiple nodes in the network. This becomes the real life part that was added to the 
simulation making up the whole testing environment. Before presenting the final testing 
environment shown in Figure 4.1 that follows, it will be beneficial to first give a quick 
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overview of Wireshark and the AirPcap Network adapter and why it was added to the 
testing environment. Wireshark is a well-known network protocol analyzer tool that is 
used by many I.T network administrators to monitor and troubleshoot issues in their 
network [25]. It has the capability of capturing and saving network states at a given 
period of time for later processing [25]. These network states are comprised of captured 
time stamped frames with detailed information such as header and protocol information 
[25]. In order to satisfy the second realistic element described earlier, the SNR value must 
also be captured from the network for use as input into the “AWGN” channel. This 
ensures that the probability of the number of bit flips is dependent on the real SNR value 
sensed from the network for each frame captured and not dependent on a fix SNR value. 
In order to obtain this value from the capture using Wireshark in the Windows 
environment, the AirPcap network adapter was used [26]. This AirPcap allows for full 
raw 802.11 captures in the Windows environment and the SNR value was extracted from 
each frame captured. AirPcap allows Wireshark to capture not only good frames but also 
extend the capability to capture erroneous frames as well. This is used to get an idea of 
the percentage of frames lost in transmission for a given capture. With these capabilities 
at hand, it seemed to be a natural addition into the testing environment in order to keep 
it as realistic as possible. The only aspect that is not realised in this hybrid testing 
environment is mobility. As it was mentioned earlier the MATLAB/Simulink simulator 
lacks a mobility model and therefore must be captured in the real portion. The 
challenging part is that a lot of parameters must be accounted for when dealing with 
mobile nodes such as movement patterns and speed that could affect the overall 
performance. This could yield confounding variables that could skew the results. The 
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other challenging thing about mobility in a real life scenario is being able to accurately 
define each parameter so that the experiment can be duplicated for later verification or 
testing. Due to the added complexity that mobility might add and the already 
unpredictable nature of wireless it was decided to keep the scenarios static. This will 
allow the thesis to fully focus on the evaluation of the Hamming distance but in a wireless 
ad hoc network instead. This offers the opportunity for future work to investigate the 
effectiveness of the Hamming distance metric in a MANET where the parameters can be 
observed more carefully. The only thing left now is to explain how the data from 
Wireshark is filtered and formatted for use in the MATLAB/Simulink simulation portion. 













































































































































































































































































































































































4. Hybrid Testing Environment 
As it can be seen from Figure 4.1, the testing environment is comprised of the 
“Wireshark & Java” and the “MATLAB/Simulink” as the main sections. The 
MATLAB/Simulink section is split further into three subsections identified by letters B, 
C, and D in the same figure. The Wireshark & Java section is given a letter A identifier 
not to indicate a subsection consisting within but for the only purpose of ease of reference 
when referring to the figure. Starting off with section A from Figure 4.1, this section 
makes up the real portion of the testing environment. It is responsible for the capturing 
of real wireless frames using Wireshark and performs pre-processing using the custom 
Java application developed to format the data for input into the MATLAB/Simulink 





Figure 4.2 Wireshark & Java Process Flow Diagram 
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As it can be seen from Figure 4.2, there are two main processes. The first process uses the 
captured Wireshark inputs it into the TShark network protocol analyzer. This TShark 
network protocol analyzer is a just a command line version of Wireshark and only used 
for ease of exporting filtered data using the redirection operator available in Windows 
command prompt terminal. The TShark filtering commands used to produce the five 
“.dat” output files seen in Figure 4.2 are listed below with: 
 
cmd1. tshark -r WiresharkCapture.pcapng -T fields -e wlan.fcs_good >> isGoodAll.dat 
 
cmd2. tshark -R "(ip.src==<IPaddress> && http) || (ip.src==<IPaddress> && ftp)" -r 
WiresharkCapture.pcapng -T fields -e wlan.fcs_good >> isFCSGood.dat 
 
cmd3. tshark -R "(ip.src==<IPaddress> && http) || (ip.src==<IPaddress> && ftp)" -r 
WiresharkCapture.pcapng -T fields -e tcp.srcport >> protoFile.dat 
 
cmd4. tshark -R "(ip.src==<IPaddress> && http) || (ip.src==<IPaddress> && ftp)" -r 
WiresharkCapture.pcapng -T fields -e radiotap.db_antsignal >> SNRFile.dat 
 
cmd5. tshark -R "(ip.src==<IPaddress> && http) || (ip.src==<IPaddress> && ftp)" -r 
WiresharkCapture.pcapng -x >> extractDataBytes.dat 
 
 
The first TShark command “cmd1” is issued to redirect filtered results into the 
“isGoodAll.dat” which contains the status in binary format of each frame received with 
value 1 as good and 0 as erroneous. This file is used for calculating the percentage of 
frames in error for the Wireshark capture for the whole network. The second command 
“cmd2” is issued to redirect filtered results into the “isFCSGood.dat” file which contains 
the same binary status output describe for “cmd1” but it filters out only the frames 
sourced from the specified IP address. This is used to identify all the frames received 
without error to ensure that the frame is uncorrupted for manipulation later in the 
Figure 4.3 TShark Filter Commands to Generate Data Files 
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MATLAB/Simulink portion. The handling of these frames will be explained later. The 
third command “cmd3” redirects filtered results into the “protoFile.dat” file which 
contains the port value 21 for FTP or 80 for HTTP protocol for each frame sourced from 
the specified IP address. The fourth command “cmd4” redirects filtered results into the 
“SNRFile.dat” file which contains the SNR value sensed for each corresponding frame 
captured sourced from the specified IP address. The last command “cmd5” redirects 
filtered results from TShark into the “extractedDataBytes.dat” file which contain the 
Wireshark Byte hex dump for each frame sourced from the specified IP address. As 
Figure 4.2 shows, this last file does not go directly into the simulation portion, instead it 
is used as input for the second process.  
 
 This second process is a java program that was custom built to take the Wireshark Byte 
hex dump of each frame and reformatted it into a serial bit representation. An example 
of the reformat of one frame can be seen below in Figure 4.4 where the Wireshark Byte 
hex dump frame is on the left and the resulting serial bits representation is on the right. 
The separation lines found in this figure were added to clearly mark out the three sections 
of the hex dump. The part of the dump that is of interest is found in the middle with hex 
numbers in groups of two. This middle section represents the actual frame. The offset 
numbers found in the first column indicate the position of each line in the dump. The java 
program uses this offset to find the start of the new frame with offset value “0000” and 
also to identify new lines. The last column is the ASCII translation of the hex numbers 
which is discarded. After knowing the format of the hex dump, the java program will 
parse out each line of hex numbers and convert them into binary, stringing each line 
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together to form one serial bit line seen in Figure 4.4. Finally, The 32 CRC bits that are 
found in the FCS field at the end of the frame is removed. Once each of the frames have 
been reformatted it is outputted to the “dataMatlabFormat.dat” and ready for use in the 
MATLAB/Simulink simulation. This java program code is provided in the Appendix B 




Figure 4.4 Frame Reformat from Wireshark to MATLAB/Simulink Example 
 
 Referring back to Figure 4.1, section B is the starting point in the MATLAB/Simulink 
simulation. This section is responsible for simulating side channel communication. As it 
was defined earlier in the background section of this thesis, a side channel is created by 
purposely corrupting frames using a different CRC polynomial. As it can be seen, there 
are only two CRC polynomials used here in the “General CRC Generator”, one is termed 
as “Default” and the other as “Koopman”. The Default CRC polynomial was used as the 
normal communication while Koopman was used as the side channel communication. 
The CRC generator function is designed to take a frame, calculate the CRC value based 
on the specified polynomial and add it to the end of the frame. Section B starts off at the 
decision gate indicated by point 1 in the figure where two things happen. The first thing 
is the values found in the “isFCSGood.dat” file described earlier is used to identify the 
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corresponding good and erroneous frames found in the “dataMatlabFormat.dat” file. 
Reiterating the fact earlier that this guarantees that the frame bits have not been naturally 
corrupted during capturing from section A. Any frames that were captured in error are 
discarded. The second thing is the “protoFile.dat” file is used to identify if the frame 
received in good was HTTP or FTP based on source port value 80 or 21 respectively. Once 
the frame has been identified as either HTTP or FTP it is pushed through the decision 
gate and on to the CRC generator. If the frame was identified as FTP then the CRC is 
calculated using the Koopman CRC polynomial to simulate a side channel frame. If the 
frame was identified as HTTP then the CRC is calculated using the Default CRC 
polynomial simulating a normal frame. As seen at point 2 is another CRC generator using 
the same Default CRC polynomial. The frame that goes through the generator at this 
point is the same one that was identified as good before it went into the decision gate at 
point 1. The reason for this second CRC generator using the Default polynomial is for 
generating the uncorrupted version of the same frame for comparison later when 
calculating the Hamming distance.  
 
Section C commences at point 3 after the appropriate CRC is generated for the 
frame and appended to the end. The purpose of section C in the MATLAB/Simulink 
simulation portion is to simulate the channel properties which includes the probability 
for a frame being in error and if so, the number of bits flipped. At point 3 the frame is 
given a chance to be in error based on the probability inputted to the “Frame Error 
Probability Decider” function. At the decision gate at point 4, if the frame is determined 
to not be in error then it is sent to the next section D of the simulation. However, if the 
51 
 
4. Hybrid Testing Environment 
frame is determined to be in error is it passed through the “AWGN” channel for 
corruption. The important thing to note here is the use of the SNR value that comes from 
the “SNRFile.dat” mention earlier to ensure that the number of bits flip in the frame is 
depended on dynamic values and not a fixed ones. This value is obtained for each 
corresponding frame and is used as input into the channel at point 5 to corrupt that frame 
and it is then sent to the next section D.  
 
Section D has two responsibilities, the first one is to compare the two different 
frames received from point 2 and the frames that passed through the simulation from 
point 1 by calculating the Hamming distance at point 6. Note that the Hamming distance 
is calculated on the FCS portion of the frame otherwise known in this case the CRC value 
at the end of the frame. If the calculated Hamming distance value is 0 then it can be 
confidently identified that the frame is a normal frame that was not corrupted. Otherwise 
a Hamming distance value of greater than 0 has two possible cases. The first case is that 
it was a normal frame that was naturally corrupted or the second case is that it was side 
channel frame using the Koopman CRC polynomial. After the Hamming distance is 
calculated, the CRC value of the frame originating from point 1 and its resulting 
Hamming distance it is sent for output at point 7 which marks the second responsibility 
of section D. The output is also responsible for evaluating and printing the results. The 
output reports on the individual Hamming distance calculated for each received frame. 
It also calculates metrics such as the true positive(TP), false positive(FP), true 
negative(TN), false negative(FN), accuracy, sensitivity, specificity and the F-Score which 
is defined next in Table 4.1. These scores listed in the table will be reviewed in detail in 
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the next chapter when they are used in evaluating how effective the Hamming distance 
is as a metric for detection. 
 
 




This concludes the detailed overview of the testing environment which will be later 
utilised in the next section to validate the Hamming distance metric using a known 
Perceptron Learning algorithm and used for determining the Hamming distance 








5    Validating and Evaluating the 
Hamming Distance Metric 
 
So far Hamming distance has only been introduced as a possible detection metric for side 
channel communication. In order to be able to confidently say that it can be used as a 
detection metric, further validation is needed. Once the metric is validated, the next 
question that follows is how effective is this metric for detection. This question will be 
explored using well known evaluation metrics listed in Table 4.1 from the previous 
chapter. Before validation or evaluation can be performed, testing data must be obtained 




5.1 Experimental Setup 
 
In order to obtain data for use in the validation and evaluation of the Hamming distance, 
a physical experimental setup is needed to capture the necessary frames for the testing 
environment outlined in Chapter four. This testing environment had a real component 
that used the AirPcap and Wireshark together to capture real data frames for using in the 
simulation portion. The whole experimental setup is illustrated by Figure 5.1. The setup 
consists of 5 nodes that are communicating and one agent node that is in promiscuous 
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mode responsible for capturing data. As seen in the figure, the agent node is equipped 
with the AirPcap adapter and is running Wireshark. Being in promiscuous mode the 
agent is not participating in the communication and thus to avoid any chance of mistaken 
capture from the agents built-in wireless card, it was disabled. Each node in the setup 
were each given a static IP that started from 192.168.1.2 to 192.168.1.6.  
 
For the purpose of referencing, each node will be identified by the far right least 
significant digit in its IP address. Node 2 with the label “Red Node” located in the top 
floor of the house is tasked to run both the HTTP and FTP server applications. The HTTP 
stream rate is 192kb/s which is approximately 23.4kB/s while FTP transfer rate is varied 
from 16kB/s, 32kB/s and 64kB/s. HTTP will stream a 22.5MB mp3 music file while FTP 
will transfer a 5MB file for all three varied rates. Node 3 also labelled with “Red Node” 
located in the basement floor will be the only node that will participate in the FTP 
transfer. As it was described in the previous chapter in the test environment section, the 
FTP traffic will be simulated as the side channel while the HTTP will be simulated as the 
non-side channel traffic. Node 2 and 3 will be participating in side channel and thus the 
reason why they are labelled as red nodes. Along with the side channel FTP traffic, nodes 
2 and 3 will also participate in non-side channel traffic by streaming HTTP traffic. Nodes 
4, 5, and 6 labelled with “Blue Node” will only participate by streaming non-side channel 
HTTP traffic. Note that the number of nodes was also varied from 5, 4, 3 and finally 2 to 
form different node configurations. Nodes 2 and 3 will always be left in the scenario as 
they are the only ones participating in side channel communication while other nodes are 
taken out. The order of removal was arbitrary selected which was the following: 
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1. Node 6 (192.168.1.6) 
2. Node 4 (192.168.1.4) 



















Figure 5.1 Experimental Setup for Capturing Real Data Frames 
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Essentially each node configuration had three different experiment runs for the different 
FTP transfer rates. One other variable that needs to be mention but not directly included 
in the node setup is the frame error percentage (FE %). This FE% is introduced in the 
simulation portion which was varied from 0% to 100% with 5% step increases. With all 
these parameters combined this would make up 252 total experimental scenarios. These 
parameters can be summarized in Table 5.1 below. 
 




5.2 Validating Using the Perceptron Learning & Pocket 
Algorithm 
 
To recap, the Hamming distance measure was the number of bits different between two 
CRC bit values. It was seen by the preliminary work done in chapter 3 that this metric 
was very promising for the use of detection based on the hypothesis. This hypothesis was 
that the Hamming distance value would be significantly higher for an intentionally 
corrupted frame (side channel frame) than a naturally corrupted frame when compared 
with the actual CRC value that was calculated on the same frame. The average Hamming 
distance values were approximately 16 versus 8 respectively which shows a noteworthy 
gap between the two that suggest the metric can be plugged into a classifier algorithm 
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and used for validation. In other words, if a known classifier algorithm is able to use this 
Hamming distance metric to find distinct clusters or separation between given data then 
it is safe to say that the metric is valid for detection. This will start the introduction into 
the Perceptron Learning Algorithm (PLA) and Pocket Algorithm (PA) for the validation 
of the Hamming distance metric. 
 
 Perceptron Learning Algorithm (PLA) is a supervised learning algorithm with 
reinforcements [27]. It is capable of learning how to classify data that is linearly separable 
[27]. The main idea is that it uses a simple line to separate the different clusters of data 
points. Each line that separates correctly the two different cluster is called a perceptron 
[27]. This line is based on the equation 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 + 𝑏𝑏  where m is the slope and b is the 
intercept. This equation is rewritten as 𝑤𝑤1𝑥𝑥 + 𝑤𝑤2𝑦𝑦 + 𝑤𝑤3𝑏𝑏 = 0 where b is equal to 1 and 
coefficients that make up the weight vector (w1, w2, w3) [27]. Both training and testing 
data set consist of points with x, y pairings. However for each point in the training data, 
there will be an identifier that tells the algorithm which class it belongs to [27]. These 
classes can be thought of as clusters which can be identified by a 0 or 1 [27]. PLA uses 
these identifiers in the learning phase for reinforcement learning [27]. The learning phase 
starts by drawing a line with a random slope and intercept which are specified by 
randomly picking the weights [27]. Note that this random way of picking the weights is 
done only once to initialize them. Once the first line is drawn, the next step is to evaluate 
the position of the line from the data points [27]. Essentially this line would act as the 
divider between the two different classes. So for each data point (x,y) an error is 
calculated based on which side of the line the point falls on [27]. Based on the error PLA 
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will readjust its weight vector and redraw the lines. It will repeat these weight 




Figure 5.2 PLA Training Data Example 
 
 
 Figure 5.2 shows all the different possible perceptron that could be drawn that are 
identified by the dotted lines. The solid black line shows the possible final perceptron 
that completely separates the two different classes. Note that the number of perceptron 
that are obtained during any run of the PLA is always different and also the equation line 
of the final is not guaranteed to be the same. If the data is like the above example in Figure 
5.2 then it can be characterized as linearly separable and the algorithm will eventually 
converge to zero. If the data is not linearly separable then the error will never converge 
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to zero. The worst case is that the error will start to increase or fluctuate based on the 
number of iteration it runs causing the algorithm to run infinitely. This is where the 
“Pocket” Algorithm (PA) comes into play. PA handles non-linearly separable data by 
changing two things. Firstly, because the data is not linearly separable which could cause 
the original Algorithm to run infinitely, PA requires that a predetermined max iteration 
value must be set [27]. Secondly, PA will keep track of the last weight vector values 
obtained after each iteration and compare them with the next. Based on the calculation 
for that iteration, the best weight vector is kept and the others are discarded [27]. This is 
like the analogy of taking the old one out of the “pocket” and replacing it with a better 
new one [27]. This process is done for each iteration until the maximum iteration is 
reached [27]. Once the training data is exhausted and the final perception is obtained then 
the testing may begin. Test points are then added to the system and classified based on 
the side of the perceptron line it falls on [27]. Both these algorithms are very simple to 
understand and implement which is one of the reasons why it is chosen to be used in the 
validation of the Hamming distance metric. The java code containing the implementation 
of the Pocket Algorithm can be found in Appendix C for further reference. In particular, 
PA is able to handle non-separable data which is a great advantage for dealing with real 
network data. 
 
 For validation in the Pocket Algorithm for validation, data was obtained from one of 
the 5 node scenarios outline in the experimental setup section. The 5 node scenario 
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 The experiment runs as follows, at time 0 seconds all 4 nodes (3, 4, 5, and 6) will start 
the HTTP music streaming from node 2. The agent node will start capturing traffic data 
using Wireshark. A stopwatch is used to keep time. When the time hits 120 seconds 
(2minutes) the FTP transfer is started from node 3. At time approximately 440 seconds 
(7minutes) the FTP transfer is complete. The streaming continues on all 4 nodes until the 
full 480 seconds (8minutes) duration is completed, at which time the agent node’s 
Wireshark capture is stopped and saved for preprocessing. This preprocessing and 
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simulation can be reviewed in Chapter four when the detailed overview of the hybrid 
testing environment was given. Once processed it is ready to be used in the simulation 
portion of the hybrid testing environment. The data will flow through the simulation as 
described earlier with the FE% varied from 0%-100% with the 5% step increase. This 
would yield a total of 21 different results. Once the simulation is finished the summary 
of the resulting frame counts are provided along with the Hamming distance output 
results. For each of the 21 results the Hamming distance values and both the naturally 
corrupted and intentionally corrupted (total counts listed below) are consolidated into 
one data file output. This output data is now used for input into the Pocket Algorithm for 
training. The testing data was obtained from a running the same 5 node scenario with the 
same parameters except that it was ran only for approximately 5 minutes 38 seconds and 
the file sent over FTP was started approximately after 1 seconds to ensure that the whole 
file was transmitted. The total counts for the testing data is also listed below. Both the 
training and the testing data was formatted to form a scatter plot where each Hamming 
distance was set as both x and y coordinate. After putting the training data into the Pocket 
Algorithm, the results can be seen below in Figure 5.3 plot. 
 
List of Resulting frame counts from the simulation (PA-Training data): 
• Total Number of Corrupted frames: 190,486 
• Total Number of naturally corrupted frames: 190,276 
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List of Resulting frame counts from the simulation (PA-Testing data): 
• Total Number of Corrupted frames: 20,686 
• Total Number of naturally corrupted frames: 20,476 




Figure 5.3 Training Data Scatter Plot of Frame’s HD values and Perceptron Result 
 
 Figure 5.3 presents all the 20,686 Hamming distance values classified into the two 
classes 0 and 1. Class 0 represents the Hamming distance values obtained from non-side 
channel frames and class 1 are the values from the side channel frames. Note that the plot 
figure is a little deceiving as it looks like only a total or 31 data points are plotted including 
both class 0 and 1. The reason for this is the overlapping Hamming distance values that 









5. Validating and Evaluating the Hamming Distance Metric 
between the two classes which shows the non-linearity of the data. However a perceptron 
was still found. This perceptron can then be used in the testing phase with test data. The 




Figure 5.4 Scatter Plot of Frame’s HD values and Test Data Results of using the obtained 
Perceptron 
 
 The results show from Figure 5.4 above that PA was able to correctly classify side 
channel from non-side channel frames approximately 99% of the time using the 
Hamming distance metric. However, it was only able to correctly classify side channel 
frames approximately 28% of the time. The lower 28% classification rate of side channel 
frames could be attributed to a higher amount of naturally corrupted frames versus the 
intentionally corrupted frames which was 20,476 and 210 respectively. This means that 
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may yield a better result if a windowing analysis technique was applied in sampling only 
a small portion of frames that suspected to be side channel. Again this is left for future 
work that would explore the best window size for an effective analysis. Overall the results 
have shown that the Hamming distance is a valid metric for distinguishing side channel 
frames from non-side channel frames. Even though the Pocket Algorithm was able to 
show that the Hamming distance was effective in distinguishing between side channel 
and non-side channel frames, the question that still remains is how effective this metric 
is. This starts the exploration into the scores that can be used to evaluate how effective 
the Hamming distance metric is. These were briefly introduce in the previous chapter in 
Table 4.1. 
 
5.3 Evaluation of the Hamming Distance Metric 
 
In order to get an idea of why these scores were chosen, it is best to present the results to 
be evaluated. The experimental scenario used of the evaluation of the Hamming distance 
metric for this section also contains 5 node but is run with only one FE%. The FE% used 
was the actual value captured which was 18.87%. The 5 node scenario parameters can be 
summarized in Table 5.3 below. The resulting frame counts also follows below. 
 
List of Resulting frame counts from the simulation (Evaluation 5 node scenario): 
• Total Number frames: 26,772 
• Total Number of uncorrupted frames: 21,741 
• Total Number of naturally corrupted frames: 5,031  
• Total Number of Intentionally corrupted frames (FTP/side channel): 10 
66 
 
5. Validating and Evaluating the Hamming Distance Metric 
 
 




The results from this 5 node scenario outlined in Table 5.3 can be represented as a scatter 
plot of resulting Hamming distance values in Figure 5.5 below. The triangles are the FTP 
that represents side channel frames and the dots are the HTTP that represents non-side 
channel frames. From the figure it is clear to distinguish between the non-side channel 
frames that are in error from the ones that are not. The dots that are concentrated on the 
line where Hamming distance is 0 are all the frames that are not in error while all others 
scattered above are erroneous. Note also the region where the FTP transmission occurred 
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which is sectioned out by the drawn box. A magnified version is also provided to give a 
better idea of the spread of frames within that FTP region as the unmagnified version 
looks falsely like there are only 6 frames in a straight line. In order to get this magnified 
version, the x-axis scale was simply stretch out while the y-axis was left untouched .One 
other thing to note is that there is no clear separation between the Hamming distance 
values of the side channel frames and the non-side channel frames. This can be attributed 
to the natural error causing random number of bits to be flipped during transmission. If 
for example a detection threshold was used, depending on the where these overlapping 
points fall, they could account for the false positives and false negative defined in Table 
4.1. If the detection threshold was picked where the Hamming distance was equal to 2 
for example, from the figure it can be seen that any dots above this threshold would be 
considered as false positives. At threshold equal to 14 yields fewer false positives but also 
causes false negatives with a few of the triangle side channel frames below the threshold. 
Choosing a threshold like 17 for example would yield no false positives but again increase 
the number of false negatives as more triangles are seen below the threshold line. This 
alludes to the idea that the effectiveness of using Hamming distance for detection is based 
on the threshold value chosen. By varying the Hamming distance values, the effective 
threshold for detection can be determined when the ideal condition is met where the both 
the true positive and true negative scores are maximized while both the false positive and 
false negative scores are minimized. This would require the true and false scores to be 
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Figure 5.5 Hamming Distance Results for Scenario:5MB@16kB/sec with 18.87% Frame Error 
 
 This can be challenging if there is a large number of scenarios which could introduce 
human error from possible inconsistencies when evaluating the four scores for the best 
threshold. To avoid this, five more scores can be used that are based on the four true and 
false scores. These are also listed in Table 4.1 as Accuracy, Sensitivity/Recall, Specificity, 
Precision and F-Score. These evaluation metrics are commonly used in evaluating and 
assess classification and detection algorithms [28]. They can be used to further assess the 
Hamming distance metric for its effectiveness for distinguishing side channel from non-
side channel frames. Accuracy assesses the overall effectiveness of an algorithm by 
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scores [28]. Sensitivity or recall assesses the effectiveness of the algorithm to correctly 
identify true positives [28]. Specificity assess the effectiveness for the algorithm to 
correctly identify true negatives [28]. Precision assesses the algorithms predictive power 
in correctly identifying the true positives from the false positives [28]. The F-Score is a 
composite measure that focuses on the effectiveness of the algorithm to identify true 
positives compared to the false positive and false negative. To recap with respect to 
detection of side channel frames using Hamming distance, accuracy will measure how 
well Hamming distance can correctly identify side channel and non-side channel frames. 
Sensitivity or recall will measure how well Hamming distance can correctly identify all 
instances of side channel frames. Specificity on the other hand will measure how well 
Hamming distance can correctly identify all instances of non-side channel frames. 
Precision will measure how well Hamming distance can predict the side channel frames 
from the non-side channel frames. Finally the F-Score measures how well Hamming 
distance can correctly identify side channel frames while limiting the false identification 
such as non-side channel frames identified as side channel or side channel frames missed 
identified as non-side channel. Looking at the formula of the F-Score from Table 4.1, it is 
apparent that it is based on both precision and sensitivity/recall which depend on the true 
positive, false negative, and false positive scores. Taking this into account, a high F-Score 
will indicate that the Hamming distance was able to effectively identify side channel 
frames while at the same time limiting false scores such as non-side channel frames 
identified as side channel (False Positive) or side channel frames identified as non-side 
channel (False Negative).Ultimately, this F-Score metric will be used to assess the 
effectiveness of the Hamming distance metric at different threshold values. 
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 Taking the results from the 5 node scenario presented in Figure 5.5, all the evaluation 
metrics can be computed for each of the Hamming distance threshold values from 1 to 
21. Note that the only computed values are for the first 21 threshold as there are no points 
above this value. Also Note that the time window used was the full eight minute run of 
the scenario. This means that the resulting evaluation metrics are based on the entire data 
set represented in Figure 5.5 and not only within the “FTP Region” when the FTP was 
transmitted. The selection of a good time window to use for detection would easily be a 
thesis problem on its own and is not within the scope of this thesis but suggests future 
work that can be done. The advantage of using the entire resulting data set is it will add 
additional noise and will act as a stressor for testing. This will help strengthen the results 
of the effectiveness of Hamming distance metric. The resulting calculations can be seen 
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 As stated before, the F-Score is affected by precision and sensitivity/recall and it’s at 
its highest when both of these metrics are maximized. This is confirmed in the results 
where both precision and sensitivity/recall are the highest at 0.2778 and 0.5000 
respectively, yielding the best F-Score of 0.3571. Looking deeper into the definition of 
precision and sensitivity/recall they are affected by the True positives scores. The 
difference is that sensitivity focuses on the ratio of true positive versus false negative and 
72 
 
5. Validating and Evaluating the Hamming Distance Metric 
precision on true positive versus false positives. So this means that sensitivity/recall only 
evaluates how well side channel frames are classified for a given threshold value but does 
not take into account the number of errors in missed classifications of non-side channel 
frames. This is where precision comes into play by accounting for these false positives 
(non-side channel frames missed classified as side channel). This can be seen from the 
result Table 5.4, where thresholds with Hamming distance of 1 through 6 yields a perfect 
effective sensitivity/recall score of 1. However the corresponding precision score is closer 
to 0 (0.0020 – 0.0027) which gives a better idea of the effectiveness of those thresholds. In 
other words because the thresholds for detection is so low anything above it is considered 
as side channel frames which explains the high amounts of false positives attributing to 
the precision score of nearly 0. This can be verified visually by looking at Figure 5.5 for 
example, if  a Hamming distance threshold was picked at 2, any erroneous non-side 
channel frames (indicated by the dots) falling above this line would be counted as side 
channel which would add to the false positives score. Conversely, if the Hamming 
distance threshold was picked at 17 for example, from the results the corresponding 
sensitivity/recall and precision values are 0.2000 and 0.4000 respectively. This is almost 
the reverse effect seen here, where the precision may falsely indicate a better effective 
threshold but in actuality by looking at the sensitivity/recall metric it is not. This is due 
to the fact that the false positives have dramatically decreased and the false negatives 
have increased. Again visually this can be seen from Figure 5.5 where the majority of non-
side channel frames correctly fall below the threshold at Hamming distance 17. At the 
same time some side channel frames do fall below this threshold value and therefore are 
classified incorrectly as non-side channel adding to the number of false negatives.  
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After examining these two extremes, it is evident that the ideal scores for precision 
and sensitivity/recall when both of them are maximized at the same time. Instead of 
trying to weigh these scores independently, the F-Score is used instead as an overall 
indicator for the most effective Hamming distance threshold value. As for the other 
evaluation metrics such as accuracy and specificity, they both give a good indication on 
how well each of the threshold value can correctly distinguish side channel from non-
side channel frames up to a certain point. This point is when the false negative start to 
become more evident and then these measures just plateau at a value. These two 
measures are good to confirm directionally how effective each threshold is but the F-
Score appears to be the best indicator to find the optimal one. As it was seen from the 
resulting table above, the most effective Hamming distance threshold value that resulted 
from this scenario was 15 which yields an F-Score of 0.3571. These results help show that 
even with all the noise an effective Hamming distance threshold value is still attainable. 
The question that still remains is if an effective threshold value can still be found with 





Chapter 6  
 
6    Determining an Effective Threshold 
 
So far it has been shown that the Hamming distance has very promising results in its 
validation and evaluation. Presented with the 5 node scenario used in the evaluation 
section of Chapter 5, an effective threshold of Hamming distance equal to 15 was obtained 
with an F-Score of 0.3571. The only thing that could be said about this result is that an 
effective Hamming distance threshold was found for the 5 node scenario with parameters 
outline in Table 5.3. In other words there needs to be some confidence that these results 
did not occur by chance due to some unknown variable in this one 5 node scenario. 
 
6.1 Hamming Distance Population Mean Confidence Interval 
 
One way to do this is to run as many scenarios as possible in order to see if these results 
can be generalized to other circumstances. This can be impossible as there may be an 
infeasible number of scenarios to run. A finite way would be to generate all possible 
frame bit strings instead of actually capturing real data and passing them through the 
simulation. Through the simulation, the corresponding CRC values are generated for 
each frame using both the default and the Koopman CRC32 polynomial. Finally, the total 
average Hamming distance can then be determined for both non-side channel and side 
channel frames. If there is a statistically large difference between the two population 
averages, then it can be 100% stated that a threshold for detection would be in between 
75 
 
6. Determining and Effective Threshold 
the two averages. The only issue is that in order to obtain whole population of all possible 
combination of a 2342 bit frame [11], there would have to be in total 22342 frame bit strings 
generated. To get an idea of what 22342 looks like, Maple 18 [29] was used to calculate this 
exponential number which resulted in small paragraph of digits.  
 
 This could present itself as future work in determining all the possible 22342 
combination frame bit strings but due to the limited time and computational power 
another option is to come up with an educated guess on what the average Hamming 
distance would be if it were possible. In other words find some confidence level that 
predicts the mean population Hamming distance. This can be done by finding a 
confidence interval that the mean population would fall in with a suitable confidence 
level using a large sample of the population’s 22342 possible frame bits. Using the same 
testing methodology, a sample of these frames can be obtained from the capturing of real 
data. The only thing to watch out for is that the Hamming distance values obtained are 
normally distributed and the sample size is large enough (>30), in order to obtain a 
confidence interval using the z-tables [30]. 
 
 Let’s first re-explore the results obtained from the 5 node scenario outlined in Table 5.3 
used for the evaluation section of Chapter 5. The same results are used to calculate the 
confidence intervals for the mean Hamming distance value for both non-side channel and 
side channel frames. The purpose is to first predict what the population Hamming 
distance mean for both non-side channel and side channel frames is and secondly, 
observe if they fall below and above the determined threshold. In other words if the 
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predicted population Hamming distance mean for both the non-side channel frames and 
side channel frames are below and above the threshold respectively. The first thing that 
has to be done is take out all the uncorrupted non-side channel frames that correspond 
to all Hamming distance values of 0. Let’s first calculate the mean, mode, median, sample 
variance, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, Kurtosis and Skewness for the 
Hamming distance values obtained from all the corrupted non-side channel frames. 
Remember that these are the frames that are calculated using the default CRC32 
polynomials that have been naturally corrupted. Referring to plot in Figure 5.5, these are 
all the dots that have a Hamming distance value greater than 0. The resulting statistical 




Figure 6.1 Hamming Distance Value Histogram Distribution & Statistical Calculation for 
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 As it can be seen from Figure 6.1, the median and the mode is 8 which is close to the 
mean Hamming distance of approximately 8.057. The coefficient of variation is 
approximately 0.303 which by definition shows that the Hamming distance values are 
pretty uniform and centered on the mean. As expected it can be observed that the shape 
of the histogram plot is normally distributed. This normality can also be confirm from the 
Kurtosis and Skewness values which lay between -1.96 and +1.96 [30]. Now the sample 
mean and the standard deviation can be used to calculate the mean confidence interval 
with a particular confidence level. The resulting mean confidence interval for both 95% 
and 99% confidence level can be seen below in Figure 6.2 below. What the results mean 
is that there is a 95% chance that the population mean Hamming distance will fall 
approximately between 7.989 and 8.124 and also a greater 99% chance that it’s between 
7.968 and 8.145. A 99% chance that the average Hamming distance value for any non-side 
channel frame is very close to 8 means that the resulting threshold of 15 determined by 
the best F-Score for this 5 node scenario is very promising as a detection threshold. The 
only thing left is to find out what the population mean Hamming distance is for side 
channel frames with the same level of confidence. Remember that these are the frames 
that were intentionally corrupted using the Koopman CRC32 polynomial. Referring to 
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Figure 6.2 Population Mean Confidence Interval of Non-side Channel Frames for Scenario: 
5node@16kB/s with 18.87% FE 
 
 One thing to note is that the number of side channel frames is only 10 which is 
definitely less than 30. This will mean that the distribution is not guaranteed to be normal 
as the sample size is too small to make that assumption [30]. However the confidence 
interval can still be computed using the t-distribution along with the t-table [30]. The 
resulting statistical and confidence interval calculation can be seen below in Figure 6.3. 
Notice first that resulting confidence interval has widened due to the sample size being 
less than 30. However results still show a 95% chance that the average population 
Hamming distance will fall approximately between 12.487 and 16.912 and also a 99% 
chance that it will be between 11.521 and 17.879. Even though the lower end of the mean 
falls below the threshold of 15, it is still significantly larger than the population mean of 
the non-side channel frames which indicates that there is separation between them. 
Obviously these confidence intervals are not as impressive as the once for non-side 
channel frames due to the small sample size. In order decrease the interval size but keep 
the confidence level at 95% and 99%, the sample size of side channel frames must be 
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Figure 6.3 Statistical Calculation & Population Mean Confidence Interval of Side Channel 
Frames for Scenario: 5node@16kB/s with 18.87% FE 
 
 In order to increase the sample size of side channel frames, another 5 node scenario 
was ran with the parameters listed in Table 6.1. This was the same 8 minute capture with 
an increase in the size of the FTP file. In order to keep the capture with 8 minutes the 
transmission rate was increased to 64kB/s. Again the data will flow through the 
simulation as described earlier. The only thing to note is that the frame error probability 
value used for input into the “Frame Error Probability Decider” was 19.82%. This value 
was the true value obtained from the actual capture. The following list is the resulting 
frame counts: 
 
List of Resulting frame counts from the simulation: 
• Total Number of frames: 26,461 
• Total Number of uncorrupted frames: 21,277 
• Total Number of naturally corrupted frames: 5,184 
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Table 6.1 Experimental Parameters for New Scenario: 5Node@64kB/s with 19.82% FE 





 The results from this scenario outlined in Table 6.1 yielded a threshold value of also 15 
with an F-score value of 0.5507. For further reference see Appendix D for the resulting 
evaluation metrics for this scenario. The confidence intervals for both non-side channel 
and side channel were calculated again for this new scenario. The results can be seen in 
Figure 6.4 and 6.5. Figure 6.4 shows both the statistical and confidence interval results of 
a non-side channel frames. It can be noted that the results are almost identical to the first 
5 node scenario presented and more importantly the confidence intervals are pretty much 
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the same for the same 95% and 99% confidence level. In fact the interval is smaller than 
what was observed in the results shown in Figure 6.2. This is very significant because it 
confirms that due to the larger sample size, the confidence interval is smaller and falls 
within the interval calculated earlier. This is going to be expected for the side channel 
frames Hamming distance population mean as well because the sample size was increase 
to be greater than 30 frames. This is confirmed with the results shown in Figure 6.5 where 
the interval has become smaller for the same 95% and 99% confidence level. Showing a 
95% chance that the average population Hamming distance will fall approximately 
between 14.760 and 16.862 and also a 99% chance that it will be between 14.401 and 
17.220. Notice also that the upper bounds are pretty much the same as before but the 
lower bound mean has increased closer to15. These results help to show that non-side 
channel frames Hamming distance tend to fall closer to 8 while the side channel fall closer 
to 15. This also helps generalize the results to other types of scenarios as the frames that 
are captured are just samples of the 22342 possible frames in the population.  Essentially 
there is a 99% chance that the average non-side channel frames will fall somewhere 
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Figure 6.4 Statistical Calculation & Population Mean Confidence Interval of Non-side 




Figure 6.5 Statistical Calculation & Population Mean Confidence Interval of Side Channel 
Frames for Scenario: 5Node@64kB/s with 19.82% FE 
 
It is clear to see from these scenarios the number of side channel frames affects 
both the confidence interval and the F-Score values. In these cases both the values are 
better. It will be advantages to examine what happens to these scores if the side channel 
frames are dramatically increased. The expected outcome would be that they would yield 
better results. In order to obtain more simulated side channel frames from the already 
existing captured data of the 5 node scenario at 16kB/s, the FTP data frames from port 
83 
 
6. Determining and Effective Threshold 
number 51434 was filtered out this time to use in the simulation. The resulting frame 
counts can be shown as follows: 
 
List of Resulting frame counts from the simulation using port 51434: 
• Frame Error percentage: 15.87% 
• Total Number of frames: 33,175 
• Total Number of uncorrupted frames: 27,975 
• Total Number of naturally corrupted frames: 5,200 
• Total Number of Intentionally corrupted frames (FTP/side channel): 6,413 
 
It can be seen from the resulting frame count that the FTP/side channel frames have 
increased to 6,413. This is approximately 20% more than the naturally corrupted ones. 
Realistically the number of side channel frames should not outnumber normal traffic 
within a specified time window to avoid detection but for the sake of testing this is 
allowed. It is clear that the FTP frames filtered out from port 51434 are the FTP data 
frames itself. Port 21 were FTP control frames while port 51434 were FTP data frames 
which explains the large difference in counts. In order to use the newly obtained FTP data 
frames from port 51434 for comparison of confidence interval and F-Score, the means 
must be confirmed that they come from the same population as the sample of frames 
from port 21. To confirm this the t-test is applied with the following hypothesis to test: 
 
• Null Hypothesis: The two means are equal (from the same population) 
• Alternative Hypothesis: The two means are not equal (not from the same population) 
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The results of the t-test show the t-statistic value to be -0.351 and the t-Critical value is 
1.645. The null hypothesis is rejected based on the condition that if |t-statistic| > t-Critical 
value [31]. For this case the t-statistic value is less than the t-Critical value and thus there 
is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. This means that there is a very good 
chance that they are equal which in turn can be stated that the sample comes from the 
same population. Intuitively this is true as the frame bits obtained would come from the 
same population of 22342 possible frame bits. Now the confidence interval of the HD 
population mean can be calculated to see the effects of dramatically increasing the 
number of side channel frames for the same 95% and 99%.  
 
The resulting mean confidence interval for non-side channel frames for both 95% 
and 99% are 7.952−+ 0.0759 and 7.952−+ 0.0998 respectively. Notice that this is again nearly 
identical to the confidence interval calculated for the other two 5 node scenarios with less 
side channel frames. The resulting mean confidence interval for side channel frames for 
both 95% and 99% are 15.974−+ 0.0797 and 15.974−+ 0.1047 respectively. Essentially there 
is a 99% chance that the average non-side channel frames will fall somewhere between 
7.852 and 8.052 and side channel frames falling between 15.870 and 16.079. These results 
help to confirm that the means obtained from this larger sample of side channel frames 
has a smaller margin of error with the same 95% and 99% confidence interval. It also helps 
to confirm that there is still a threshold for detection that exist as there is clear separation 
between the two population means. The resulting F-Score value was 0.946 with 
corresponding best HD threshold for detection set at 11. Note that these results are 
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presented and can be confirmed in Appendix E. It is significant to note that the F-Score 
value is a lot higher when the number of side channel frames is also very high. This can 
be confidently attributed to the increase in side channel frames as the non-side channel 
frames are pretty much the same across all the 5 node scenarios evaluated. Again this 
confirms that realistically an adversary would have to dramatically reduce the number 
of side channels to successfully evade detection. The only question now is what threshold 
would be the most effective with a more realistic low side channel frame count. 
 
6.2 Determining an Effective Threshold for Detection 
 
Now that it has been confirmed that a Hamming distance threshold for detection does 
exist, the search becomes finding the most effective one to use across different types of 
scenarios. The first step in determining a generalizable solution that can be applied to 
other scenarios is figuring out what scenario variables that can affect the Hamming 
distance values. Restated, the question would be what possible variables in the scenario 
is this Hamming distance metric sensitive to? As it was shown before in Chapter five, the 
F-Score is the best indicator of how effective a Hamming distance threshold value is for 
a particular scenario. It was also shown that this F-Score value was greatly affected by 
the precision and sensitivity/recall metrics which in turn were greatly affected by the false 
negative and false positive scores. In a perfect scenario these scores would be 0 making 
precision and sensitivity/recall both 1 which in turn make the F-Score 1. So the question 
is what factor makes a scenario become flawless in order obtain a perfect F-Score? The 
answer to this question is having no error. Conversely stated, the amount of error affects 
the F-Score. This affect was also seen when the Hamming distance metric was used in the 
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validation using the Pocket Algorithm. The resulting threshold then was roughly 17 but 
had a 28% detection rate of side channel frames. This low percentage of detection was 
attributed to the high volume of errors compared to the number of side channel frames 
present which was used for training and testing. If this were the case then the two 
resulting Hamming distances would be 0 and values greater than 0. The values greater 
than 0 would identify all the side channel frames with no false negative or false positives. 
On the other hand when the number of side channel frames outnumbered the non-side 
channel frames the F-Score yielded better values that were closer to 1. Based on the 
characteristics of wireless communication and more specifically the MANET 
environment, it is clear that transmission error cannot be avoided and realistically the 
number of side channel frames would be very low to avoid detection.   
 
However it is possible to identify scenario variables that could directly affect the 
amount of error which can then be varied to test for an effective Hamming distance 
threshold value. The scenario variables that may have an effect on the amount of error 
were introduced earlier in Chapter five when the experimental setup was discussed, are 
number of nodes, percentage of errors and the transmission rate. The number of nodes 
can affect the amount of errors due to radio interference or can increase the amount traffic 
in the shared medium which can cause more chances of error. If the cause of error is not 
known then the percentage of frame error can be introduced to see if an effective 
threshold is still obtainable. Seeing as the objective is to identify intentionally corrupted 
from naturally corrupted frames, the increase in error would cause the false negative and 
false positives scores to go up which cause the F-Score to go down. The transmission rate 
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will affect the number of errors seen at a particular time window. As there is no time 
window analysis, this variable maybe not affect the scores in this case as the HTTP rates 
are fixed and the FTP finishes transmission within an 8 minute window. However the 
rates will still be varied to see if there would be any effect. 
 
 To recap, the number of nodes was varied from 2, 3, 4 and 5 plus 1 agent in each. For 
each number of nodes the percentage of frame error was changed from 0% to 100% with 
5% step increases. The transmission rate was be increased from 16kB/s, 32kB/s and 64kB/s. 
The total number of experiments was 252 (number of nodes * transmission rate * varied 
FE%). The summary of the parameters can be references in Table 5.1 in Chapter 5. After 
each experiment the most effective threshold is determined by the highest F-Score. Then 
the most frequently seen threshold value is compared with the population mean intervals 
determined earlier, to see where it falls. For example, if the threshold value falls within 
the Hamming distance population mean interval of the non-side frames then it might not 
be very effective. The ideal value would fall outside but below the population mean 
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 From the resulting F-Scores in Table 6.2, it can be seen that there is a significant 
decrease in the mean F-Score value from scenario with 2 nodes to 5 nodes. This is 
consistent in all three transmission rates. The other significant observation that is constant 
across each scenario for 2 nodes to 5 nodes and all three transmission, is the decrease in 
the F-Score value from FE= 5% to 100%. Both these observations confirm that F-Score is 
affected by the number of erroneous frames present. As the number of nodes increased, 
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the number of frames would go up which results in the amount of possible erroneous 
frames to also to rise. The fascinating thing about these results is that even at the 
unrealistic FE = 100%, the F-Score value still stayed approximately around 0.30 to 0.65. 
This alludes to the fact that even though the amount of error does slightly affect the F-
Score value it is not enough to make finding an effective Hamming distance impossible. 
This can be seen in the best threshold results in Table 6.3. Note that the first row of Table 
6.3 was omitted from the calculation of the statistical measures as FE% = 0 would only 
yield the HD values of the side channel frames. The resulting best threshold from all the 
252 scenarios is seen to be 15 as it is the most frequently seen value. This is determined 
by the mode values going across the table. The second most frequently seen threshold 
value is 16. This Hamming distance thresholds of 15 or 16 seems to appear frequently as 
the most effective. Seeing as they fall outside the 99% confidence interval of the Hamming 
population mean of non-side channel frames and below the upper bound mean of the 
side channel frames, it can determined to be the most effective threshold value for use in 













The concept of the side channel was seen to be a domain specific problem where the 
existing protocol could be exploited to allow for sensitive information to be passed 
without knowledge of its presence. It also exploits the decentralized infrastructure of 
MANETs and employed the use of different CRC polynomials to disguise frames as in 
error. This is what makes it so hard to detect when errors are prone in this type of 
environment. Groups of malicious nodes are able to communicate based on using an 
agreed upon CRC polynomial that is different from the other nodes in the network. The 
CRC32 polynomial presented and explored were the default and Koopman. The default 
CRC polynomial was designated as the normal communication while Koopman was 
used for side channel.  
 
Some prior detection metrics were presented such as frame error rate (FER) and 
request to send and clear to send (RTS & CTS). Both these metrics presented some 
weakness that called for a new metric to be found. The Hamming distance metric was 
introduced as a possible detection measure for side channel communication. The concept 
of the delta CRC was also introduce as the motivation for the discovery of the Hamming 
distance metric. This delta CRC calculated the numeric difference between CRC values 
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generated by the default and Koopman polynomials to see if this yielded values that 
clustered into a unique area. The results show that no such cluster was found as the 
numerical CRC values were uniformly distributed. This sparked the idea to change the 
approach to finding the number of bits different between CRC values generated by two 
different CRC polynomial such as the default and Koopman. The hypothesis was that the 
Hamming distance value between two CRC values using two different CRC polynomials 
was greater than ones that were generated by the same polynomial but was naturally 
corrupted during transmission. The preliminary evaluation results showed that there 
was indeed a significant enough difference that warranted further investigation into the 
use of the Hamming distance as a metric for detection.  
 
This led into the survey of finding a simulator that could supported the delivery 
of intentionally corrupted frames. The simulator that showed some promise was the 
QualNet Network Simulator. After some failed attempts to modify the simulator to 
include the concept of a Frame Check Sequence, it was decided to go with a different 
approach. This approach combines the real data capture with simulation and was 
introduced as the hybrid testing environment. The real portion consisted of using the 
AirPcap adapter along with Wireshark to capture real data frames for use in the 
MATLAB/Simulink simulator. The simulator was responsible for taking these frames and 
recalculating the CRC values based on the polynomial specified and simulated the 
channel properties to include the possibility for error. The final step of the simulator 
calculated the Hamming distance values between CRC values of frames that used the 
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default and the Koopman polynomials. The output data is then used for validation and 
evaluation of the Hamming distance metric.  
 
Validation is done with the use of a well know classification algorithm called the 
Perceptron & Pocket Learning algorithm. The Perceptron Learning algorithm uses 
feature(s) to classify by finding an equation of a line that separates the data into different 
classes. The only limitation is that it can only deal with linearly separable data. If it is not 
linearly separable, then the algorithm will not converge and may run infinitely. In order 
to handle linearly non-separable data, the Pocket algorithm was developed to keep track 
of the line equation that was able to separate the data as best as it can. Like many 
classification algorithms, the feature(s) chosen is very important and can determine how 
effectively it can separate the data into different classes. If the algorithm performs well 
with certain feature(s), then it can be validated as a good feature to use distinguishing 
different classes. In this case the feature used to distinguish side channel frames for non-
side channel frames is the Hamming distance metric. The results showed that the 
Hamming distance metric was a valid feature to use for the classification of side channel 
frames and non-side channel frames. However the effectiveness was seen to change based 
on the amount of error in the network. This led to the idea of measuring how effect the 
Hamming distance metric is for different network scenarios.  
 
 The evaluation of how effective the Hamming distance metric for a particular 
network scenario is done through the use of scores such as true positives, true negative, 
false positives, and false negatives. Other metrics such as precision, sensitivity/recall, 
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specificity and accuracy were also used. It was seen that varying the Hamming distance 
thresholds yielded different score results. Some of the scores seem to minimize or 
maximized at certain threshold values. A composite of precision and sensitivity/recall 
called the F-Score determined to be the best indicator of the most effective threshold to 
use for detection for that particular scenario. It was shown that an effective threshold of 
15 was found to be the most effective for one particular 5 node scenario that was ran but 
there was no claim to prove that these results could be generalized to other types of 
scenarios. This started the investigation into finding a common or most effective 
threshold that could be generalized to other types of scenarios.  
 
In order to pin point a general effective threshold to use for detection, there needs 
to be a battery of test cases representing all possible scenarios. The only way is to generate 
all frame combinations of size 2342 bits that could be used to find all possible Hamming 
distance values that could be generated by both the default CRC and Koopman 
polynomials. The average Hamming distance values between CRC bit strings that were 
generated by the default versus Koopman polynomial can be calculated and compared 
to the average Hamming distance values for naturally corrupted bits strings that use just 
the default polynomial. If the averages were far enough apart, then any Hamming 
distance threshold value between them would suffice for detection. As it would be 
infeasible to generate all 22342 different frames, the confidence interval was calculated for 
both 95% and 99% to predict what these averages would be. The results showed that with 
99% confident, an effective threshold would lie above 8 and below 17. In order to test this, 
a total of 252 scenarios were created which varied the number nodes, the transmission 
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rates and the percentage of frame error. The results showed that the most effective 
threshold was a Hamming distance value of 15 which was frequently chosen as the best 
across all 252 scenarios. This confirmed with the confidence interval results.  
 
7.2 Evaluating the Weaknesses 
 
The purpose of this section is to explore possible weaknesses that relate to using the 
Hamming distance as a metric for detection of side channel communication. It also hopes 
to spark further work in strengthening the approach or give new direction in finding a 
better more resilient metric.  
 
The first weakness with this approach is that it can only be applied to a wireless 
network environment which assumes that the nodes are using the default CRC 
polynomial while the adversary nodes use the Koopman CRC polynomial. The results 
cannot be applied to other possible CRC polynomials that may exist. In other words if the 
adversary nodes use a different CRC polynomial other than Koopman then the Hamming 
distance metric might fail. If the adversary nodes use another technique to corrupt the 
CRC value found in the FCS field then this metric might also fail.  
 
A second weakness is the lack of scalability in the experiments as the number of 
nodes is limited to the availability of physical equipment such as laptops or tablets. As it 
was seen, the number of nodes did have an effect on the amount of possible errors that 
could occur in the network which could weaken the effectiveness of the Hamming 
distance metric. A simulation solution would be able to confirm this. However the results 
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still show that this Hamming distance metric did hold up to high unreasonable or 
unrealistic percentages of frame error such as 90%-100%.  
 
One last weakness relates to the channel model used in the simulator portion of 
the hybrid testing environment. Even though it was designed to use real SNR values 
sensed from the real data captured, it is still a model that might not represent the real 
world. However these models do a very good job. This weakness is common when it 
comes to working with simulation where the only way to confirm the results is being able 




7.3 Future Works 
 
Throughout the thesis there were many mentions to possible future works that could be 
done. The first that was mentioned was the idea to take this side channel problem and 
apply it to a wired network that was more centralized. The question to answer is if this 
type of centralized environment would help or hinder the concealment of the side 
channel. In regards to environment, the second mention was to investigate the 
effectiveness of the Hamming distance metric in a MANET. This requires further 
exploration in mobility patterns and parameters that could cause the Hamming distance 
metric to become ineffective in detection of side channel communication. A third future 
work that may help improve the effectiveness of the Hamming distance metric is 
investigating the window size for sampling. It was mentioned that if an ideal window 
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size was found that captured less legitimate errors then this would reduce the false 
negative and false positive scores. This could then be furthered by applying both the 
Hamming distance metric and a window sizing technique to develop a detection 
algorithm or system. A forth future work is to compare the effectiveness of using the FER 
metric versus the Hamming distance metric. Finally the last future work is exploring the 
idea of finding CRC polynomials that would be better disguise intentionally corrupting 
frames as legitimate error. The direction could be taking a second look at the delta CRC 
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Configuration settings for the Simulink Modules in Figure 3.1: 
 
Bernoulli Binary Generator Settings:        Signal To Workspace: 
                         
 










Section 1 – General CRC Generators 
 
CRCG-Sender:                CRCG-Verify: 








Section 2 – Binary Symmetric Channels 
 
Binary Symmetric Channel 1:                           Binary Symmetric Channel 2: 




Section 3 – Selectors 
 






Section 4 – Receiver CRC Generator 
 
CRCG-Receiver:                       Selector 4: 





















Section 5 – Delta CRC calculators 
 
Logical Operator 1:                     Logical Operator 2: 
                 
 


























DNEvsDEHDresults=[]; %stores the HD results after comparision 
DNEvsDEMean=0; %stores the mean 
DNEvsDEMedian=0; %stores the median 
DNEvsDEMode=0; %srotes mode 
DNEvsDEVariance=0; %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
DNEvsDESTDev=0; %sqrt of variance 
  
%Koopman woError 
DNEvsKNEHDresults=[]; %stores the HD results after comparision 
DNEvsKNEMean=0; %stores the mean 
DNEvsKNEMedian=0; %stores the median 
DNEvsKNEMode=0; %srotes mode 
DNEvsKNEVariance=0; %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
DNEvsKNESTDev=0; %sqrt of variance 
  
%Koopman wiError 
DNEvsKEHDresults=[]; %stores the HD results after comparision 
DNEvsKEMean=0; %stores the mean 
DNEvsKEMedian=0; %stores the median 
DNEvsKEMode=0; %srotes mode 
DNEvsKEVariance=0; %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
DNEvsKESTDev=0; %sqrt of variance 
  
%Castagnoli woError 
DNEvsCNEHDresults=[]; %stores the HD results after comparision 
DNEvsCNEMean=0; %stores the mean 
DNEvsCNEMedian=0; %stores the median 
DNEvsCNEMode=0; %srotes mode 
DNEvsCNEVariance=0; %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
DNEvsCNESTDev=0; %sqrt of variance 
  
%Castagnoli wiError 
DNEvsCEHDresults=[]; %stores the HD results after comparision 
DNEvsCEMean=0; %stores the mean 
DNEvsCEMedian=0; %stores the median 
DNEvsCEMode=0; %srotes mode 
DNEvsCEVariance=0; %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 




while (blockCC < length(DNE)) 
    %need to initialize all string CRC bit values with the first value in first index of that block 
    crcDefNoEr=num2str(DNE(blockCC)); 




    crcKoopNoEr=num2str(KNE(blockCC)); 
    crcKoopEr=num2str(KE(blockCC)); 
    crcCastNoEr=num2str(CNE(blockCC)); 
    crcCastEr=num2str(CE(blockCC)); 
     
    %initialize all comparison values 
    DNEvsDE=0; 
    DNEvsKNE=0; 
    DNEvsKE=0; 
    DNEvsCNE=0; 
    DNEvsCE=0; 
     
         
    for n = 0:31 %increments from the first bit to the last 32 bit block 
        arrayIn=blockCC + n; %the array index is made up of getting block added with the bit of the for 
loop 
         
        bitValDNE=DNE(arrayIn); 
        bitValDE=DE(arrayIn); 
        bitValKNE=KNE(arrayIn); 
        bitValKE=KE(arrayIn); 
        bitValCNE=CNE(arrayIn); 
        bitValCE=CE(arrayIn); 
         
        %perform Comparisons by XOR then add to find HD 
        DNEvsDE=DNEvsDE+(bitxor(bitValDNE,bitValDE)); 
        DNEvsKNE=DNEvsKNE+(bitxor(bitValDNE,bitValKNE)); 
        DNEvsKE=DNEvsKE+(bitxor(bitValDNE,bitValKE)); 
        DNEvsCNE=DNEvsCNE+(bitxor(bitValDNE,bitValCNE)); 
        DNEvsCE=DNEvsCE+(bitxor(bitValDNE,bitValCE)); 
         
    end 
     
    DNEvsDEHDresults(frCC)=DNEvsDE; %stores the HD results after comparision 
    DNEvsKNEHDresults(frCC)=DNEvsKNE; %stores the HD results after comparision  
    DNEvsKEHDresults(frCC)=DNEvsKE; %stores the HD results after comparision 
    DNEvsCNEHDresults(frCC)=DNEvsCNE; %stores the HD results after comparision  
    DNEvsCEHDresults(frCC)=DNEvsCE; %stores the HD results after comparision 
    
    frCC=frCC+1; 








DNEvsDEMean=mean(DNEvsDEHDresults); %stores the mean 
DNEvsKNEMean=mean(DNEvsKNEHDresults); %stores the mean 
DNEvsKEMean=mean(DNEvsKEHDresults); %stores the mean 
DNEvsCNEMean=mean(DNEvsCNEHDresults); %stores the mean 
DNEvsCEMean=mean(DNEvsCEHDresults); %stores the mean 
  
DNEvsDEMedian=median(DNEvsDEHDresults); %stores the median 
DNEvsKNEMedian=median(DNEvsKNEHDresults); %stores the median 
DNEvsKEMedian=median(DNEvsKEHDresults); %stores the median 
DNEvsCNEMedian=median(DNEvsCNEHDresults); %stores the median 





DNEvsDEMode=mode(DNEvsDEHDresults); %srotes mode 
DNEvsKNEMode=mode(DNEvsKNEHDresults); %srotes mode 
DNEvsKEMode=mode(DNEvsKEHDresults); %srotes mode 
DNEvsCNEMode=mode(DNEvsCNEHDresults); %srotes mode 
DNEvsCEMode=mode(DNEvsCEHDresults); %srotes mode 
  
DNEvsDEVariance=var(DNEvsDEHDresults); %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
DNEvsKNEVariance=var(DNEvsKNEHDresults); %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
DNEvsKEVariance=var(DNEvsKEHDresults); %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
DNEvsCNEVariance=var(DNEvsCNEHDresults); %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
DNEvsCEVariance=var(DNEvsCEHDresults); %stores the variancesum[ (xi -mean)2 ]/n 
  
DNEvsDESTDev=std(DNEvsDEHDresults); %sqrt of variance 
DNEvsKNESTDev=std(DNEvsKNEHDresults); %sqrt of variance 
DNEvsKESTDev=std(DNEvsKEHDresults); %sqrt of variance 
DNEvsCNESTDev=std(DNEvsCNEHDresults); %sqrt of variance 
DNEvsCESTDev=std(DNEvsCEHDresults); %sqrt of variance 
  
strFName = strcat('HDStats_NumOfFrames',num2str(frCC-1),'_wiAWGNSNR10','_',execTime); 
strFNameOut=strcat(strFName,'.txt'); 
fOut = fopen(strFNameOut,'wt'); 
  
fprintf(fOut,'HD Comparision: Default woErrors vs Default wiError \n'); 
fprintf(fOut,'Mean: %-4.3f \n',DNEvsDEMean); 
fprintf(fOut,'Median: %-4.3f \n',DNEvsDEMedian); 
fprintf(fOut,'Mode: %-4.3f \n',DNEvsDEMode); 
fprintf(fOut,'Variance:%-4.3f \n',DNEvsDEVariance); 
fprintf(fOut,'Standard Deviation: %-4.3f \n',DNEvsDESTDev); 
fprintf(fOut,'Coefficient of Variation (CV): %-4.3f \n',(DNEvsDESTDev/DNEvsDEMean)); 
fprintf(fOut,'\n'); 
  





fprintf(fOut,'Standard Deviation:%-4.3f \n',DNEvsKNESTDev); 
fprintf(fOut,'Coefficient of Variation (CV): %-4.3f \n',(DNEvsKNESTDev/DNEvsKNEMean)); 
fprintf(fOut,'\n'); 
  





fprintf(fOut,'Standard Deviation:%-4.3f \n',DNEvsKESTDev); 
fprintf(fOut,'Coefficient of Variation (CV): %-4.3f \n',(DNEvsKESTDev/DNEvsKEMean)); 
fprintf(fOut,'\n'); 
  





fprintf(fOut,'Standard Deviation:%-4.3f \n',DNEvsCNESTDev); 
fprintf(fOut,'Coefficient of Variation (CV): %-4.3f \n',(DNEvsCNESTDev/DNEvsCNEMean)); 
fprintf(fOut,'\n'); 
  








fprintf(fOut,'Standard Deviation:%-4.3f \n',DNEvsCESTDev); 

















public class tSharkParser{ 
 public static void main(String[] args){ //at run line input format: FilenameToParse 
TotalNumberOfPackets Matlab[-m] type[-bin] space[-s] keepFCS[-fcs] 
  char[] decimForm = {'0','1','2','3','4','5','6','7','8','9','a','b','c','d','e','f'}; 
        String[] binaryForm = 
{"0000","0001","0010","0011","0100","0101","0110","0111","1000","1001","1010","1011","1100","1101","1110",
"1111"}; 
  String[] binaryFormS = {"0 0 0 0","0 0 0 1","0 0 1 0","0 0 1 1","0 1 0 0","0 1 0 1","0 1 1 0","0 1 
1 1","1 0 0 0","1 0 0 1","1 0 1 0","1 0 1 1","1 1 0 0","1 1 0 1","1 1 1 0","1 1 1 1"}; 
         
  String fNameTrans= args[0]; 
  int totNumPack=Integer.parseInt(args[1]); 
  String isMatlab="-n"; 
  String hexVSbin="-hex"; 
  String isSpaced="-n"; 
  String keepFCS="-n"; 
  if(args.length==3){ 
   isMatlab = args[2]; 
  } 
  if(args.length==4){ 
   hexVSbin = args[3]; 
  } 
  if(args.length==5){ 
   isSpaced = args[4]; 
  } 
  if(args.length==6){ 
   keepFCS = args[5]; 
  } 
   
  String[] binSeqData = new String[totNumPack]; 
  String[] hexSeqData = new String[totNumPack]; 
        String[] recFCS = new String[totNumPack]; 
        double[] decFCS = new double[totNumPack]; 
         
  Queue<String> theFCS = new LinkedList<String>(); 
   
  if(isMatlab.contains("-m")){ 
   //System.out.println("File: "+ fNameTrans+" Display type: Matlab input formatted"); 
  }else{ 
   System.out.println("File: "+ fNameTrans+" Display type: "+ hexVSbin + " " + isSpaced + " " + 
keepFCS); 
  } 
  try { 
   String line = ""; 
   String nextLine =""; //stores the last line before we hit the new packet 




   String recFCSTemp =""; //temp store for the FCS, concatinate each byte pair 
            String hexSeqDataTemp=""; 
   File inFile = new File(fNameTrans); 
   BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(new FileInputStream(inFile))); 
   int index = 0; 
   int flagFirstRun = 0; 
   /* 
   *Read each line, split using spaces " " 
   *The first entry of every line is 2 bytes 
   *the first line, first entry is identified by 0000 
   *the entry of each line contains period characters '.', check for those to signal last entry 
   *everything in the middle is valid data in sets of 1 byte(two values) each seperated by space 
   *the last 4 bytes(4 sets of two vlaues) is the fcs, treat that differently 
   *still need to find a way to store the last 4 
   */ 
   while ((nextLine = br.readLine())!= null && index < totNumPack){ //the nextLine read will fail, 
so after the while must process the last line with the FCS 
    if(flagFirstRun == 0){ 
     line = nextLine; 
     nextLine = br.readLine(); 
     flagFirstRun=1; 
    } 
    String[] tempLine = line.split(" "); 
    String[] tempNextLine = nextLine.split(" "); 
                if(tempNextLine[0].length()==4){//checks to make sure it is not a newline and signals a 
new packet 
     //process line 
     //System.out.println(line); //test print print each line 
      
      
     for(int i=1; i<tempLine.length; i++){ 
      //do binary conversion for each byte(value pair) to 8bits 
      //also add each byte to the queue 
                        if(tempLine[i].length()==2 && tempLine[i].indexOf(".")<0){ 
                            hexSeqDataTemp=hexSeqDataTemp+" "+tempLine[i]; 
                            char[] valAt = new char[2]; 
                            valAt[0] = tempLine[i].charAt(0); 
                            valAt[1] = tempLine[i].charAt(1); 
                            for(int f1=0; f1<2; f1++){ 
                                int found=-1; 
                                for(int f2=0; f2<decimForm.length; f2++){ 
                                    if(valAt[f1]==decimForm[f2]){ 
                                        found = f2; 
                                    } 
                                } 
         
                                if(found>-1){ 
         if(isSpaced.contains("-s")){ 
          binSeqDataTemp=binSeqDataTemp +" "+binaryFormS[found]; 
         }else{ 
          binSeqDataTemp=binSeqDataTemp +""+binaryForm[found]; 
         } 
                                } 
                            } 
                             
                            if(theFCS.size()<4){ 
                                theFCS.add(tempLine[i]); 
                            }else{//the queue is max out at 4 
                                //remove one and add one 




                                theFCS.add(tempLine[i]); 
                            } 
                        } 
                         
     } 
     //after done process the line, line = nextLine 
     line = nextLine; 
    }else{ 
     //process the last line with the fcs before going to new line 
     for(int i=1; i<tempLine.length; i++){ 
      //do binary conversion for each byte(value pair) to 8bits 
      //also add each byte to the queue 
      if(tempLine[i].length()==2 && tempLine[i].indexOf(".")<0){ 
                            hexSeqDataTemp=hexSeqDataTemp+" "+tempLine[i]; 
                            char[] valAt = new char[2]; 
                            valAt[0] = tempLine[i].charAt(0); 
                            valAt[1] = tempLine[i].charAt(1); 
                            for(int f1=0; f1<2; f1++){ 
                                int found=-1; 
                                for(int f2=0; f2<decimForm.length; f2++){ 
                                    if(valAt[f1]==decimForm[f2]){ 
                                        found = f2; 
                                    } 
                                } 
                                if(found>-1){ 
                                    if(isSpaced.contains("-s")){ 
          binSeqDataTemp=binSeqDataTemp +" "+binaryFormS[found]; 
         }else{ 
          binSeqDataTemp=binSeqDataTemp +""+binaryForm[found]; 
         } 
                                } 
                            } 
                            if(theFCS.size()<4){ 
                                theFCS.add(tempLine[i]); 
                            }else{//the queue is max out at 4 
                                //remove one and add one 
                                theFCS.remove(); 
                                theFCS.add(tempLine[i]); 
                            } 
                        } 
 
     } 
     //System.out.println(line); //test print print each line 
     for(int y=0; y<4; y++){ 
                        recFCSTemp = theFCS.remove()+""+recFCSTemp; 
                    } 
                     
                    double decFCSTemp=0.0; 
                     
                    for(int fc1=7; fc1>-1; fc1--){ 
                        int foundc=-1; 
                        for(int fc2=0; fc2<decimForm.length; fc2++){ 
                            if(recFCSTemp.charAt(fc1)==decimForm[fc2]){ 
                                foundc = fc2; 
                            } 
                        } 
      //System.out.println(foundc+" "+ foundc*(Math.pow(16,(7-fc1)))); //testing 
                        if(foundc>-1){ 
                            decFCSTemp=decFCSTemp+(foundc*(Math.pow(16,(7-fc1)))); 




                    } 
     String binSeqDataTempminusFCS=""; 
     String hexSeqDataTempminusFCS=""; 
     if(keepFCS.contains("-fcs") && !(isMatlab.contains("-m"))){ 
      binSeqDataTempminusFCS = binSeqDataTemp; 
      hexSeqDataTempminusFCS = hexSeqDataTemp; 
     }else{ 
      if(isSpaced.contains("-s")){ 
       binSeqDataTempminusFCS = binSeqDataTemp.substring(0,binSeqDataTemp.length()-
(32*2)); 
       hexSeqDataTempminusFCS = hexSeqDataTemp.substring(0,hexSeqDataTemp.length()-
(12*2)); 
      }else{ 
       binSeqDataTempminusFCS = binSeqDataTemp.substring(0,binSeqDataTemp.length()-32); 
       hexSeqDataTempminusFCS = hexSeqDataTemp.substring(0,hexSeqDataTemp.length()-12); 
      } 
                    } 
     if(hexVSbin.contains("-hex") && !(isMatlab.contains("-m"))){ 
      System.out.println(index+1+" "+hexSeqDataTempminusFCS+" "+recFCSTemp+" "+ decFCSTemp); 
//test print print each line 
     }else{ 
      if(isMatlab.contains("-m")){ 
       System.out.println(binSeqDataTempminusFCS); //print out for Matlab input 
      }else{ 
       System.out.println(index+1+" "+binSeqDataTempminusFCS+" "+recFCSTemp+" "+ 
decFCSTemp); //test print print each line 
      } 
     } 
     hexSeqData[index] = hexSeqDataTempminusFCS; 
                    binSeqData[index] = binSeqDataTempminusFCS; 
     recFCS[index] = recFCSTemp; 
                    decFCS[index] = decFCSTemp; 
     //after line is process line readIn 
     index++; 
     binSeqDataTemp=""; 
     recFCSTemp=""; 
                    hexSeqDataTemp=""; 
                    decFCSTemp=0.0; 
     line= br.readLine(); 
    } 
   } 
   //the nextLine read will fail, after must process the last line with the FCS 
   br.close(); 
           








Java Perceptron & Pocket Learning Algorithm Code: 
 
/** 
 *The Pocket Algorithm 
 *Visal Chea 
 * 
 *Perceptron Learning Algorithm Code adapted from: 
 *https://github.com/RichardKnop/ansi-c-perceptron 
 *and  
 *Dr Noureddin Sadawi http://people.brunel.ac.uk/~csstnns/tutorials.html 










 static int MAX_ITER = 1000; 
 static double LEARNING_RATE = 0.1;            
 static int theta = 0;   
   
   
 public static void main(String[] args){ //cmdLine format: FilenameToParse TotalNumberOfPackets 
TestFileName TotNumberofTest isScatter 
   
  String fNameTrans= args[0]; 
  int totNumPack=Integer.parseInt(args[1]); 
  String fNameTest=args[2]; 
  int totNumTest=Integer.parseInt(args[3]); 
  int isScatter = Integer.parseInt(args[4]); //0-scatter(x=y) 1-frameVSHD(x=frame#, y=HDvalue) 
  //1 features = 1 variable x but plotted (x,x)                       
  int[] x = new int [totNumPack];     
  int[] y = new int [totNumPack];     
  int[] outputs = new int [totNumPack]; 
   
  //class 0 non SC 
  int[] datax1=new int[totNumPack]; 
  int[] datay1=new int[totNumPack]; 
  int sizeData1=0; 
   
  //class 1 SC 
  int[] datax2=new int[totNumPack]; 
  int[] datay2=new int[totNumPack]; 
  int sizeData2=0; 
   
  //testing points 
  int[] datax3=new int[totNumTest]; 
  int[] datay3=new int[totNumTest]; 




   
  double correctClassify=0; 
   
  double correctSCClassify=0; 
  double numOfSCinTest=0; 
   
     
  //while loop to read in file with HD class(0-nonSC,1-SC[ftp]) 
  try { 
   String line = ""; 
   File inFile = new File(fNameTrans); 
   BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(new FileInputStream(inFile))); 
   int index = 0; 
   /* 
   *Read each line, split using spaces " " 
   * x y class 
   *frame HD class(0-nonSC,1-SC[ftp]) 
   */ 
   while ((line = br.readLine())!= null && index < totNumPack){ //the nextLine read will fail, so 
after the while must process the last line with the FCS 
    //System.out.println("index: "+ index +"\n"); 
    String[] tempLine = line.split(" "); 
    outputs[index] = Integer.parseInt(tempLine[1]); 
    if(isScatter==0){//0-scatter(x=y) 
     x[index]=Integer.parseInt(tempLine[0]); 
     y[index]=Integer.parseInt(tempLine[0]); 
     if(outputs[index]==0){ //in class 0 
      datax1[sizeData1]=x[index]; 
      datay1[sizeData1]=y[index]; 
      sizeData1++; 
     }else{ //in class 1 
      datax2[sizeData2]=x[index]; 
      datay2[sizeData2]=y[index]; 
      sizeData2++; 
     } 
    }else if(isScatter==1){//1-frameVSHD(x=frame#, y=HDvalue) 
     x[index]=index; 
     y[index]=Integer.parseInt(tempLine[0]); 
     if(outputs[index]==0){ //in class 0 
      datax1[sizeData1]=x[index]; 
      datay1[sizeData1]=y[index]; 
      sizeData1++; 
     }else{ //in class 1 
      datax2[sizeData2]=x[index]; 
      datay2[sizeData2]=y[index]; 
      sizeData2++; 
     } 
    } 
     
              
    //System.out.println(x[index]+"\t"+outputs[index]); 
    index++; 
   } 
   br.close(); 
           
  } catch (FileNotFoundException ex) { 
   // 
  } catch (IOException ex) { 
   //    




   
     
  double[] weights = new double[3];// 2 for input variables and one for bias 
  double[] pocketWeights = new double[3]; 
  double localError, globalError; 
  int p, iteration, output; 
         
  weights[0] = randomNumber(0,1);// w1 
  weights[1] = randomNumber(0,1);// w2 
  weights[2] = randomNumber(0,1);// // this is the bias 
             
  iteration = 0; 
  double RMSE = 0; 
  double bRMSE = 1; 
  do { 
   iteration++; 
   globalError = 0; 
   //loop through all instances (complete one epoch) 
   for (p = 0; p < totNumPack; p++) { 
    // calculate predicted class 
    output = calculateOutput(theta,weights, x[p], y[p]); 
    // difference between predicted and actual class values 
    localError = outputs[p] - output; 
    //update weights and bias 
    weights[0] += LEARNING_RATE * localError * x[p]; 
    weights[1] += LEARNING_RATE * localError * y[p]; 
    weights[2] += LEARNING_RATE * localError; 
    //weights[3] += LEARNING_RATE * localError; 
    //summation of squared error (error value for all instances) 
    globalError += (localError*localError); 
   } 
    
    
   //System.out.println("Iteration "+iteration+" : error = "+globalError); 
    
   /* Root Mean Squared Error */ 
   RMSE = Math.sqrt(globalError/totNumPack); 
   //System.out.println("Iteration "+iteration+" : RMSE = "+RMSE); 
    
   if(RMSE < bRMSE){ //we have a new best value and new weights to put in pocket 
    pocketWeights[0]=weights[0]; 
    pocketWeights[1]=weights[1]; 
    pocketWeights[2]=weights[2]; 
    bRMSE = RMSE; //new best RMSE value 
   } 
    
  } while (globalError != 0 && iteration<=MAX_ITER); 
  System.out.println("\nTotal Iteration "+iteration+" : RMSE = "+RMSE); 
   
  if(RMSE>0 && iteration>MAX_ITER){ 
   System.out.println("Did not converge best RMSE = " +bRMSE); 
   if(bRMSE <= RMSE){ //it did not converge and the error went back up, revert back to the weights 
in the pocket 
    weights[0]=pocketWeights[0]; 
    weights[1]=pocketWeights[1]; 
    weights[2]=pocketWeights[2]; 
    System.out.println("=======\nPocket Decision boundary equation:"); 
    System.out.println(weights[0] +"*x + "+weights[1]+"*y +  "+weights[2]+" = 0 \n"); 
   } 




   System.out.println("=======\nDecision boundary equation:"); 
   System.out.println(weights[0] +"*x + "+weights[1]+"*y +  "+weights[2]+" = 0 \n"); 
  } 
     
  //Here we test a few new points 
   
  try { 
   String lineTest = ""; 
   File inFileTest = new File(fNameTest); 
   BufferedReader brTest = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(new 
FileInputStream(inFileTest))); 
   int indexTest = 0; 
   /* 
   *Read each line, split using spaces " " 
   *HD class number class(0-nonSC,1-SC[ftp]) 
   */ 
   int xTest=0; 
   int yTest=0; 
   int ActualOutput=0; 
   while ((lineTest = brTest.readLine())!= null && indexTest < totNumTest){ //the nextLine read 
will fail, so after the while must process the last line with the FCS 
    String[] tempLine = lineTest.split(" "); 
    if(isScatter==0){//0-scatter(x=y) 
     xTest= Integer.parseInt(tempLine[0]); 
     yTest= Integer.parseInt(tempLine[0]); 
     datax3[sizeData3]=xTest; 
     datay3[sizeData3]=yTest; 
     sizeData3++; 
    }else if(isScatter==1){//1-frameVSHD(x=frame#, y=HDvalue) 
     xTest= indexTest; 
     yTest= Integer.parseInt(tempLine[0]); 
     datax3[sizeData3]=xTest; 
     datay3[sizeData3]=yTest; 
     sizeData3++; 
    } 
    ActualOutput = Integer.parseInt(tempLine[1]); 
    output = calculateOutput(theta,weights, xTest, yTest); 
    if(ActualOutput==1){ 
     numOfSCinTest++; 
     //System.out.println("frameHD = "+yTest+", ActualClass = SC"); 
    }else{ 
     //System.out.println("frameHD = "+yTest+", ActualClass = nonSC"); 
    } 
     
    if (output==1 && ActualOutput==1){ 
     correctClassify++; 
     correctSCClassify++; 
     //System.out.println("Algorithm classified correctly as SC\n"); 
    }else if(output==0 && ActualOutput==0){ 
     correctClassify++; 
     //System.out.println("Algorithm classified correctly as nonSC\n"); 
    }else if(output==0 && ActualOutput==1){ 
     //System.out.println("classified incorrectly as SC\n"); 
    }else if(output==1 && ActualOutput==0){ 
     //System.out.println("classified inCorrectly as nonSC\n"); 
    } 
    indexTest++; 
   } 
   brTest.close(); 




   //System.out.println("correctClassify: "+ correctClassify +"\n"); 
   double correctAvgClassify = (correctClassify/(indexTest+0.0))*100; 
   double correctAvgSCClassify = (correctSCClassify/numOfSCinTest)*100; 
   System.out.println("Percentage of Correct Classification: "+ correctAvgClassify +"\n"); 
   System.out.println("Percentage of Correct SC Classified: "+ correctAvgSCClassify +"\n"); 
           
  } catch (FileNotFoundException ex) { 
   // 
  } catch (IOException ex) { 
   //    
  } 
   
  System.out.print("datax1 = ["); 
  for (int x1=0; x1<sizeData1; x1++){ 
   System.out.print(" "+ datax1[x1]); 
  } 
  System.out.print("]\n"); 
  System.out.print("datay1 = ["); 
  for (int y1=0; y1<sizeData1; y1++){ 
   System.out.print(" "+ datay1[y1]); 
  } 
  System.out.print("]\n"); 
   
  System.out.print("datax2 = ["); 
  for (int x2=0; x2<sizeData2; x2++){ 
   System.out.print(" "+ datax2[x2]); 
  } 
  System.out.print("]\n"); 
  System.out.print("datay2 = ["); 
  for (int y2=0; y2<sizeData2; y2++){ 
   System.out.print(" "+ datay2[y2]); 
  } 
  System.out.print("]\n"); 
   
  System.out.print("datax3 = ["); 
  for (int x3=0; x3<sizeData3; x3++){ 
   System.out.print(" "+ datax3[x3]); 
  } 
  System.out.print("]\n"); 
  System.out.print("datay3 = ["); 
  for (int y3=0; y3<sizeData3; y3++){ 
   System.out.print(" "+ datay3[y3]); 
  } 
  System.out.print("]\n"); 
  
 }//end main   
   
 /** 
  * returns a random double value within a given range 
  * @param min the minimum value of the required range (int) 
  * @param max the maximum value of the required range (int) 
  * @return a random double value between min and max 
  */  
 public static double randomNumber(int min , int max) { 
     DecimalFormat df = new DecimalFormat("#.####"); 
     double d = min + Math.random() * (max - min); 
     String s = df.format(d); 
     double x = Double.parseDouble(s); 







  * returns either 1 or 0 using a threshold function 
  * theta is 0range 
  * @param theta an integer value for the threshold 
  * @param weights[] the array of weights 
  * @param x the x input value 
  * @param y the y input value 
  * @param z the z input value 
  * @return 1 or 0 
  */  
 static int calculateOutput(int theta, double weights[], int x, int y) 
 { 
    double sum = x * weights[0] + y * weights[1] + weights[2]; 
    return (sum >= theta) ? 1 : 0; 
 } 





























Calculated Evaluation Metric Results for Scenario 
5Node@64kB/s with 19.82% FE:  










Statistical and F-Score Results for the 5Node Scenario with FTP 
data frames: 
 





Confidence Interval Results Scenario 5Node@16kB/s with 15.86% FE (FTP data frames 
from port 51434) 
  










t Critical one-tail 1.645167543
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.725778942
t Critical two-tail 1.960452729
Confidence Level(95.0%) 0.075939027
Lower bound mean 7.876270387
Upper bound mean 8.028148441
Confidence Level(99.0%) 0.099817547
Lower bound mean 7.852391867
Upper bound mean 8.052026961
Confidence Level=95% (non-side channel)
Confidence Level=99% (non-side channel)
Confidence Level(95.0%) 0.079666629
Lower bound mean 15.89460723
Upper bound mean 16.05394049
Confidence Level(99.0%) 0.104714876
Lower bound mean 15.86955898
Upper bound mean 16.07898874
Confidence Level=95% (side channel)









Calculated Evaluation Metric Results for Scenario 5Node@16kB/s with 15.86% FE (FTP 
data frames from port 51434) 
 
 
Threshold True(+) False(+) True(-) False(-) Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Precision F-Score
1 6413 4160 22602 0 0.8746 1.0000 0.8446 0.6065 0.7551
2 6413 4137 22625 0 0.8753 1.0000 0.8454 0.6079 0.7561
3 6413 4037 22725 0 0.8783 1.0000 0.8492 0.6137 0.7606
4 6413 3863 22899 0 0.8836 1.0000 0.8557 0.6241 0.7685
5 6413 3457 23305 0 0.8958 1.0000 0.8708 0.6497 0.7877
6 6413 2943 23819 0 0.9113 1.0000 0.8900 0.6854 0.8134
7 6408 2316 24446 5 0.9300 0.9992 0.9135 0.7345 0.8467
8 6393 1673 25089 20 0.9490 0.9969 0.9375 0.7926 0.8831
9 6351 1090 25672 62 0.9653 0.9903 0.9593 0.8535 0.9168
10 6257 662 26100 156 0.9753 0.9757 0.9753 0.9043 0.9386
11 6062 347 26415 351 0.9790 0.9453 0.9870 0.9459 0.9456
12 5715 162 26600 698 0.9741 0.8912 0.9939 0.9724 0.9300
13 5199 64 26698 1214 0.9615 0.8107 0.9976 0.9878 0.8905
14 4493 26 26736 1920 0.9413 0.7006 0.9990 0.9942 0.8220
15 3647 8 26754 2766 0.9164 0.5687 0.9997 0.9978 0.7245
16 2752 3 26759 3661 0.8896 0.4291 0.9999 0.9989 0.6003
17 1913 1 26761 4500 0.8643 0.2983 1.0000 0.9995 0.4595
18 1233 0 26762 5180 0.8439 0.1923 1.0000 1.0000 0.3225
19 701 0 26762 5712 0.8278 0.1093 1.0000 1.0000 0.1971
20 323 0 26762 6090 0.8164 0.0504 1.0000 1 0.0959
21 155 0 26762 6258 0.8114 0.0242 1.0000 1 0.0472
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